



Sitti Rahma Ma'Muna, Adam Loch, Michael D. Young 
 Robust irrigation system institutions: A global comparison 
Global Environmental Change, 2020; 64:102128-1-102128-15 
 
 
© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
 


























 Authors can share their preprint anywhere at any time. 
 If accepted for publication, we encourage authors to link from the preprint to their 
formal publication via its Digital Object Identifier (DOI). Millions of researchers 
have access to the formal publications on ScienceDirect, and so links will help 
your users to find, access, cite, and use the best available version. 
 Authors can update their preprints on arXiv or RePEc with their accepted 
manuscript . 
Please note: 
 Some society-owned titles and journals that operate double-blind peer review 
have different preprint policies. Please check the journals Guide for Authors for 
further information 
 Preprints should not be added to or enhanced in any way in order to appear 
more like, or to substitute for, the final versions of articles. 
 
17 August 2020  
Global Environmental Change
 




Article Type: Research Paper
Keywords: qualitative comparative analysis;  governance design principles;  common property
Corresponding Author: Sitti Rahma Ma'mun, Doctor of Philosophy
Adelaide, SA Australia
First Author: Sitti Rahma Ma'mun, Doctor of Philosophy
Order of Authors: Sitti Rahma Ma'mun, Doctor of Philosophy
Adam Loch, Doctor of Philosophy
Michael Young, Professor
Abstract: In many places irrigation systems rely on robust governance for continued existence.
Elinor Ostrom listed design principles that should achieve robust governance, but
doubted that any list could be both necessary and sufficient to result in robust
governance. To date this assumption has never been formally tested. We conduct a
meta-analysis and ultimately evaluate 62 case studies via fuzzy-set qualitative
comparative analysis to identify necessary/sufficient conditions for robust irrigation
system governance. We identify four necessary conditions and seven configurations
sufficient for robust governance. Further, we identify a union of conditions that, when
absent, are likely to result in system failure.
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I think the manuscript has quite improved and I think it is almost ready to be accepted
for publication in GEC.
Optionally, I do think that coding mechanisms should be further clarified. In fact I do
have issues with the 1 coder solution as I think it is prone, even with all the precautions
one can take, to biases that are inbuilt in how we perceive and understand written text.
One thing that could be done, is to show examples of specific text coded (i.e. period
xyzzy was indicative of fully in, almost in, almost out, fully out etc..). This can be done
by adding example of text in Table 1 of the supplementary material.  I also
acknowledge that having more than 1 coder requires resources that are not always
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
available, though it should lead to more robust results, and the work presented here is
really great.
Another option is to assess which cases present in this paper were also coded by Cox
et al or Baggio et al. and assess whether there are differences in the coding. This
because the ratio of missing value in this work seems quite lower than in Cox or
Baggio's work.
Finally, there is a typo at the beginning of the supplementary (I think interceding
reliability should be intercoder reliability)
-------
Thank you for the reviewer’s comments. Following your suggestion, we include the
sample of coded data for the fuzzy-set in the supplementary material in Table 9 and
10. Unfortunately, we could not compare our coded data with that of Cox et al (2010)
and Baggio et al (2016) since both articles only provide data noting the ‘presence’ or
‘absence’ of the design principles on aggregate, without referring to each case.
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Dear Prof Jennings, 
We wish to submit the manuscript entitled Robust irrigation system institutions: A global 
comparison to be considered for publication in Global Environmental Change.  The manuscript 
has not been published elsewhere, nor has it been submitted simultaneously with any other 
publication. 
In this paper, we diagnose 62 irrigation governance systems across 37 countries using Ostrom’s 
Design Principles (DP). The paper addresses Ostrom’s questions about necessary and/or 
sufficient DP conditions for robust common property regime in the case of water. The paper 
offers some enhancements to Ostrom’s DPs in manner that may assist others involved in 
searching for ways to improve the management of irrigation systems, and the governance of 
water more generally. 









Robust irrigation system institutions: A global comparison 1 
1. Introduction 2 
There are many examples of common property resources regimes (CPRs) such as fishery, 3 
forestry, pasture and water suppliessupply) that involve collective self-governance 4 
arrangements. Within that list of CPRs, small-scale irrigation water systems institutions often 5 
provide effective self-governance exemplars that are long-lasting (e.g. Janssen and Anderies, 6 
2013). Shepsle (1989) defines long-lasting institutions as robust, especially where operational 7 
rules are devised and modified over an extended period but so that desired system 8 
characteristics remain despite component part or environmental changes. Robust water 9 
governance institutions persist because, under duress, they are able to p producinge efficient, 10 
socially-acceptable outcomes (Young, 2014). 11 
An issue for future robust water governance is that many current systems institutions 12 
were established during eras when there was abundant supply (Randall, 1981; Turton, 1999; 13 
Wheeler et al., 2017; Young, 2014). . Increased water demand and rapid environmental change 14 
is testing those governance institutional arrangements, leading to concerns about future water 15 
crises (World Economic Forum, 2019) and attempts to identify robust water policy and 16 
institutional reforms (Gruère and Le Böedec, 2019). In an effort to identify institutional 17 
arrangements that would result in best outcomes from for common property resource CPR 18 
governance arrangements Ostrom (1990) provided a list of design principles (DPs) based on 19 
common findings from detailed case studies of 80 irrigation and fishery systemsinstitutions. 20 
The DPs included factors that may improve the probability of collective action and robust water 21 
governance institutionsal arrangements in the face of scarcity and uncertainty. 22 
Collective action should be most prominent where property rights are shared equally 23 
among users as common property resources (in CPRs), although free-riding and rivalry 24 
problems may reduce collective organisation (Feeney et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). CPRs are 25 
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different from open access resources to which no right of any kind is assigned (McKean, 1992; 26 
Quiggin, 1988), and their study can be traced back to the work of Gordon (1954) on an 27 
economic theory of fisheries. Thus, CPRs are not private or public property; they are 28 
geographically confined resources (Dasgupta, 2005) that are subject to the rights of common 29 
use by a group of co-equal owners (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). Ostrom’s governance 30 
DPs for CPRs have been applied to the study of collective action, and updated in response to 31 
criticism that they may be too general in nature (Cleaver, 2000). Notable Original CPR research 32 
detailing institutional arrangements for successful governance outcomes include Wade (1989), 33 
Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Plateu (1996). These studies find found that neither private nor 34 
state control determines the sustainability of common pool resourcesCPRs, but rather success 35 
comes fromfrom the  robustness of  self-governing institutions and, in particular, their capacity 36 
to that persist in an attempt to sustain the productive use of a resource as conditions and 37 
demands changes. Typically, these institutions y are characteriszed by complex rules that allow 38 
members of a community to share access to the CPR. 39 
Questions remain, however, as to whether Ostrom’s CPR governance arrangement DPs 40 
are necessary—or necessary and sufficient—conditions to ensure sustainability and long-lived 41 
robustness (Ostrom, 2009). Ostrom herself doubted that any list of DPs would be necessary 42 
and sufficient to ensure robustness, and although this would be supported by a general scan of 43 
the literature (Mahoney et al., 2009), no test has been carried out to date. Nevertheless, 44 
hOstrom’ser principles have been widely widely applied as an analytical framework to help 45 
with the evaluatione/diagnoseis of the effectiveness of local common property resource 46 
institutionsCPRs including irrigation systems (Cox et al., 2010), and multiple common 47 
property resource systems to examine the co-occurrence or combination of DPs leading 48 
tonecessary for social and ecological success (Baggio et al., 2016b). Her principles have also 49 
been used to assess case studies of success and failure in governance (Barnett et al., 2016), and 50 
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also the scope and scale limits of analytical approaches involving the use of synthesis, meta-51 
analysis and validation methods (Ratajczyk et al., 2016). However, these studies are not 52 
typically clear with regard toWhile these studies have therefore established measures of success 53 
across multiple CPRs (e.g. fishery, forestry and irrigation using presence/absence conditions), 54 
questions remain as to whether Ostrom’s CPR institutional DPs are necessary—or necessary 55 
and sufficient—conditions to ensure sustainability and long-lived robustness (Ostrom, 2009). 56 
Ostrom herself doubted that any list of DPs would be necessary and sufficient to ensure 57 
robustness, and this is supported by a general scan of the literature (Mahoney et al., 2009). To 58 
explore this question, we focus solely on an evaluation of irrigation institutions via the DPs to 59 
determine whether theire institutional arrangements appear to be  are robust, fragile or prone 60 
to a failure. These outcomes are particularly important what comprises successful governance 61 
systems, nor do they typically examine robust institutions which are an important factors for 62 
future water governance arrangements under expectations of scarcity and uncertainty with 63 
respect to supply (Young 2014). Water is a unique resource that can be used multiple times, 64 
across multiple locations, making robust adaptation to future uncertainty challenging. Many 65 
water resources have an additional challenging characteristic. Water tends to flow in a single 66 
direction with the consequence that the impacts of (ab)use tend to be uni-directional. In this 67 
paper we seek to answer Ostrom’s (2009 p.16) questions about necessary and/or sufficient DP 68 
conditions for irrigation governance systems. WTherefore, in this paper, we search for the 69 
presence/absence or links between necessary conditions and/ explore whether there are 70 
groups/combinations/configurations of sufficient conditions that constitute alternative 71 
pathways toand robust institutions in the field using a large-N case study approach. Finally, we 72 
will Based on our findings, we then offer some possible enhancements to Ostrom’s DPs in an 73 
attempt to  manner that may assist others involved in searching for ways to improve the 74 













2. Theoretical framework 76 
The overarching basis for our study is the theory of collective action which seeks to understand 77 
what factors enable some groups to achieve difficult collective outcomes, while others fail  (fail 78 
(Ostrom, 2011). Consistent with a focus on empirical validation of resource governance 79 
institutions (Janssen and Anderies, 2013), we apply Ostrom’s DPs as updated by Cox et al. 80 
(2010), and used endorsed by Ostrom in the address she gave when when she accepted her 81 
Nobel Prize (2010). The updates have resulted in a total of 11 DPs, which span the boundaries 82 
of a resource system, local conditions, rules and organiszational arrangements, monitoring, 83 
conflict resolution and sanctions, and rights recognition within nested enterpriseizsess (Table 84 
1). 85 
Formatted: Space After:  0 pt, Line spacing:  Double
5 
 
Table 1. DPs modified by Cox et al. (2010) and endorsed by Ostrom (2010) 86 
Design Principles 
1A. User Boundaries: Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are 
present. 
1B. Resource Boundaries: Clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool resource from a larger 
social-ecological system are present. 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social 
and environmental conditions. 
2B. Appropriation and Provision: appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules; the distribution of 
costs is proportional to the distribution of benefits. 
3. Collective Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to 
participate in making and modifying its’ rules. 
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are accountable to, or are, the users monitor the appropriation and 
provision levels of the users. 
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals who are accountable to, or, are the users monitor the condition of 
the resource. 
5. Graduated Sanctions: Sanctions for rule violation start very low but become stronger if a user repeatedly 
violates a rule. 
6.  Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among users 
or with officials. 
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights: The rights of local users to make their own rules are recogniszed by the 
government 
8. Nested Enterpriszses: When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological 
system, governance activities are organiseized in multiple nested layers. 
 87 
The presence/absence of institutional arrangements that are consistent with these DPs 88 
may help in informing whether or not CPR management systemsinstitutions can be improved, 89 
and whether they are prone to failure as discussed by Ostrom (2011) during her reflection on 90 
the work of Coman (1911). In thisat work, Ostrom offered advice on ways that specific 91 
institutional arrangements in particular contexts can increase the effectiveness of irrigation 92 
systems’ management, and ways to assess when collective management may produce outcomes 93 
that are superior to private or public property rights. Building on that work, in this paper we 94 
focus on case studies of common property resourcesregimes, rather than common pool 95 
resources as studied by Ostrom (1990, 2010). In particular, we focus on the institutional 96 
arrangements that determine how a resource is used and, when they fail, abused. Finally, we 97 
search for the relationship between DPs and robust water governance arrangementsinstitutions 98 
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that have not featured in previous research. As a criterion for success, we apply the earlier 99 
definition of robust institutions as the system outcome, where irrigation system governance 100 
arrangements persist under duress producing efficient use, investment preservation, and 101 
socially-acceptable outcomes. Table A2  in the Supplementary Material Appendix  to this paper 102 
details the definition of successful robust outcomes, while the following section details our 103 
analytical method and approach in greater detail. Far greater detail can also be found in the 104 
Supplementary Material for this paper. 105 
3. Methods and materials 106 
This study employs a meta-analysis approach based on identifying what does and does not 107 
work in the governance of irrigation systems. Other studies have noted limits to the comparison 108 
of global assessments in this space (Ratajczyk et al., 2016). However, we argue that much can 109 
be learned from comparative research—especially when it is empirical. We begin by searching 110 
for irrigation governance systemsinstitutions with similarities that makes meta-analysis of their 111 
key features possible. The methodology we use is based on systematic coding approaches 112 
(Poteete et al., 2010b) that use Ostrom’s DPs as explanatory variables. Objectivity Coding 113 
objectivity requires an iterative process of refining the way each variable is defined through 114 
the use of qualitative comparative analysis techniques (Rudel, 2008). 115 
3.1. Qualitative Comparative Analysis 116 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) bridges quantitative and qualitative data through a 117 
capacity to identify decisive cross-case study patterns. The cross-case pattern assessment 118 
process is designed to accommodate diversity among cases studies and account for 119 
heterogeneity with regard to different causally relevant conditions (Ragin, 1994). QCA 120 
approaches can also identify different alternative combinations of conditions capable of 121 
generating the same outcome. That is, QCA is grounded in the assessment of complex 122 
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relationships among variables, rather than correlation, as necessity and sufficiency are 123 
indicated when certain set relations exist. A key feature of QCA is that it allows researchers to 124 
reduce the complexity of empirical information to achieve greater parsimony by looking for 125 
similarities and differences among cases through logical minimiszation (Schneider and 126 
Wagemann, 2012). The approach we use is consistent with As such, Ostrom and Cox’s (2010) 127 
recommendation for ed the use of QCA approaches for the development of future DPs to deal 128 
with the lower-level aggregation of social-ecological systems (SES), especially where small to 129 
medium sample sizes preclude the use of more conventional statistical methods. A main 130 
strength of QCA is that it can analysze complex causations from small samples and identify 131 
the drivers of outcomes from multiple configurations of causal conditions (Ragin, 2009). The 132 
method enables assessment of context-specific causality including causal conditions that might 133 
have a positive or negative effects depending on the context in which it is set (Marx et al., 134 
2014). To date, QCA has been used to study irrigation institutions by Lam and Ostrom (2010) 135 
and (2015) using crisp and fuzzy datasets, respectively, derived from interview methods. 136 
Further, Baggio et al. (2016a) assess the presence and absencet of Ostrom’s DPs using a crisp-137 
set QCA across forestry, fishing and irrigation three types of CPRs. However, wWhile 138 
valuable,; however, although the results from these studies tend to be too general to enable the 139 
development of recommendations for a change in the way a specific water resource is 140 
governedare too general to draw meaningful conclusions about water governance institutions. 141 
3.2. Fuzzy-set data calibration 142 
In this study, fuzzy-set QCA (fs/QCA) methods (i.e. assessment values ranging between 0 143 
and  1) are adopted over the more common crisp-set methods (assessment values set to either 144 
0 or  1). This is justified on the basis that we seek to explain the degree of DP membership in 145 
the configuration of causal conditions that that may result in the emergence or maintenance of 146 
a constellation set of arrangements which that, when working togetherin concert, help to 147 




maintain the create a robustness of an  structureinstitutions. Robustness iIn this sense, 148 
robustness is determined by institutional the system’s capacity to adapt equitably and 149 
efficiently to ever-changing supply and demand conditions without variation of the underlying 150 
structure and rules that determine the way the institution operatesits underlying 151 
structuresystems. The underlying structure and rules arrangements withinassociated with each 152 
DP condition are not simply present or absent, but vary from context to context and thus require 153 
a more graduated metric in a manner that . However, this feature complicates the process 154 
significantly. 155 
Development of a well-constructed fuzzy-set requires a well-thought-out calibration 156 
process, as the degree of fuzzy set membership strongly influences the result of the analysis 157 
(Basurto and Speer, 2012). Consequently, Ragin (2006) recommends attention to transparency 158 
and replicability in the membership and calibration processes. Few sources provide explicit 159 
procedural advice on how to transform qualitative concepts to fuzzy values (de Block and Vis, 160 
2018). While Basurto and Speer (2012) and Toth, Henneberg and Naude (2017) offer explicit 161 
calibration procedures as a part of their research. U, unfortunately, t. Thhe calibration process 162 
in both studies, however, are is not suitable for our data because their calibration was 163 
predetermined before the data collection, whereas ours takes place after.. Further, we require 164 
calibration after the fuzzy set is defined. Thus, we turn to Adcock and Collier’s (2001) 165 
measurement validity framework and follow the structured calibration procedure set out in 166 
Figure 1. We stress that, as indicated by the arrows, this is an iterative process and that care 167 






Figure 1: Scoring, coding and calibration procedure 172 
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In fs/QCA approaches, the causal conditions selected and outcomes chosen should be 173 
based on prior theoretical knowledge and empirical insights gained throughout the research 174 
process (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Since our study is based on Ostrom’s DPs, we use 175 
the concept definitions provided by Ostrom (2010) in Table 1 as the basis for our causal 176 
conditions. Some However, some of these definitions were are then slightly modified to 177 
conform with the irrigation systems institutions under examination as( indicated by the bold 178 
text in Table 1).  179 
 Further, toFor example, consistent with recommended practice (Schneider and 180 
Wagemann 2010), we reduced the total number of conditions by, we joineding User Boundary 181 
(DP1A) and Physical (resource) Boundary (DP1B) into one condition: Clearly DefinedClearly-182 
defined Boundary. This was done because, in most of the case studies, user boundary is 183 
confined within the physical boundary of the irrigation system. That is, the user is usually 184 
expressusers are typically socially and physically constrained to the extent of the area covered 185 
by the irrigation distribution system. The complete list of final study conditions is provided in  186 
Table 2.  187 
 188 
  189 
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  190 
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Table 2: Modifications to Ostrom’s DPs for irrigation system case calibration 191 
Condition (DP) Definition 
1. Clearly-d defined 
Boundariesboundaries 
Legitimate users are clearly defined and identifiable. Physical 
limits on the extent of the resource are defined at all points in 
time, and across space. 
2a. System congruence with 
local conditions 
Appropriation and provision rules are congruent and can be 
expected to remain congruent with local and system-wide 
social and environmental conditions as they change. 
2b. Proportional equivalence 
between benefit and cost 
The benefits obtained by water users are in proportion to fixed 
and system-wide costs of operation. 
3. Collective choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can 
participate in the processes leading up to rule modification. 
4a. Monitoring of users Monitors are accountable to the users and have the with 
enforcement capacity necessary to for ensureing  
compliance withto the appropriation and use rules. 
4b. Resource system 
monitoring 
System-wide monitoring and reporting exists and is 
reported to users. 
5. Graduated sanctions Appropriators who violate operational rules face sanctions, 
preferably graduated. 
6. Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost 
local arenas to resolve conflicts. 
7. Minimum recognition of 
rights to organiseize 
The rights of local appropriators to devise their own 
institutional structures and rules are not challenged by external 
government authorities. 
8. Nested enterpriseiszes Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterpriseizes. 
 192 
3.3. Case selection 193 
The cases for the meta-analysis were sourced from Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar 194 
using search terms that initially included ‘farmers’ managed irrigation system’institution’, 195 
‘indigenous irrigation system’institution’, ‘traditional irrigation system’institution’, and ‘water 196 
user association’. 197 
To expand the initial list of potential case studies, snow-ball sampling methods were 198 
employed. That is, the links and references embodied in the initial articles found were used to 199 
source additional material, and which continued to other articles that cited the original one 200 
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articles, we followed recommendations provided by Poteete, et al. (2010a) and added all 202 
articles including those that had not been peer-reviewed in the data base. As a result, we ended 203 
up with an initial list of 240 potential case studies that were then screened using two inclusion 204 
criteria. Firstly, i) the case study article had to examine institutional arrangements in detail. 205 
ii)Second, where a case study did not provide enough information, we combined two or more 206 
articles that discussed the same irrigation system institution as into one case. In addition, we 207 
excluded any case studies that used Ostrom’s DPs to evaluate planning processes, and 208 
(combined or individual) cases studies that did not contain enough information for further 209 
analysis. Figure 2 shows the global scope of the case studies with the number per country listed 210 
in the caption to this figure (in parentheses). We ended up with 62 case studies located across 211 




Map Source: Esri (2017) 
Figure 2: Case distribution across 37 countries: Afghanistan (1), Algeria (1), Argentina (1), 
Australia (1), Bangladesh (1), Bolivia (1), Bulgaria (1), China (2), Ecuador (1), Egypt (2), 
Eritrea (2), Ethiopia (2), Haiti (1), India (2), Indonesia (5), Iran (1), Japan (1), Jordan (1), 
Kenya (3), Nepal (2), New Zealand (1), Niger (1), Nigeria (1), Oman (1), Pakistan (1), Peru 
(1), Philippines (2),South Africa (1), Spain (6), Suriname (1), Taiwan (1), Tajikistan (1), 
Tanzania (3), Thailand (3), United States (4), Yemen, (1), and Zimbabwe (1). 
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3.4. Development of the fuzzy-set 213 
The preliminary list of sub-sets was derived from best-worst practices typically found in the 214 
literature and combined with insights from the case studies (Table A1 of the Appendix). The 215 
literature and sub-set of information found was then used to develop systematic coding 216 
guidelines. After the first round of the coding, and consistent with the methodology’s iterative 217 
process, as we proceeded, we refined the fuzzy-sets and coding guidelines in accordance with 218 
the methodology’s recommended iterative process. As discussed above, a combined condition 219 
representing Clear Boundaries (BOUND) was undertaken created to reduce overlapmore 220 
accurately represent case realities, and to reduce the total number of conditions for the fs/QCA. 221 
In the case of water governance systemsinstitutions, we defined also specified water use rights 222 
as clearly defined if i) users have a right to use abstract a certain amount of water, ii) the 223 
location as to where and when water can be abstracted are specified; and iii) the ways that 224 
abstracted water can be used are pre-determined (Meinzen-Dick, 2014). Table 3 provides a list 225 
of the final fuzzy-set conditions and outcomes.  Table A1 of the appendix lists the scoring 226 
guideline that were applied. 227 
Table 3: Abbreviation of the DPs that are used in the analysis. 228 
Ten Conditions and an outcome Design Principle Abbreviation 
Clearly definedClearly-defined 
boundaries 
DP 1 BOUND 
Congruence with local conditions DP 2A LOCCON 
Proportional COST and benefit DP 2B BENFCOST 
Collective governance DP 3 COLLGOV 
User monitoring DP 4A USERMON 
System monitoring DP 4B SYSTMON 
Graduated sanctions DP 5 GRADSAN 
Conflict resolution mechanisms DP 6 CONFRES 
Minimum right to organiseize DP 7 RIGHT 
Nested enterpriseizes DP 8 NESTENT 
Robust institutions Outcome ROBUST 
 229 
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3.5. Principle compliance scoreAnalytic Hierarchy Process 230 
Transforming the raw case study data into fuzzy-set values always produces some degree of 231 
arbitrariness (Skaaning, 2011). To reduce arbitrariness in the process, a measurement is needed 232 
to translate fuzzy concepts into quantitative scores, that will can be subsequently be 233 
transformed into final fuzzy values. For validity, the measurement criteria need to capture 234 
meaningful ideas that accurately reflect the concept being used (Adcock and Collier, 2001). To 235 
address these issues weWe therefore, therefore, developed Principle Compliance 236 
Scoresfollowed the Analytic Hierarchy Process developed by Saaty (1990), involvingwhich 237 
suggests two-stage pairwise comparisons two steps ahead ofprior to arriving atsetting the the 238 
final fuzzy scores-values.. The first pairwise comparison weights the measurement criteria. T, 239 
and the second pair-wise comparison then compares the fuzzy-set based on all criteria. For 240 
example, as described by Saaty (1990), if we were buying a house we could first assess each 241 
individual option using a common set of criteria, and then secondly (when all houses were 242 
evaluated) use those criteria again to compare the full set of purchase options and identify the 243 
best purchase choice. 244 
FirstThus, we first identified a set of criteria to measure the fuzzy-set using information 245 
from the literature and substantive knowledge from the case studies. We then translated the 246 
DPs into a series of questions that could be used to identify opportunities to increase the 247 
examining what needed toshould be improved to achieve robusrobustness iof a t water 248 
governance institutions (Ostrom, 2009). For example, with for DP1 we identified four major 249 
criteria for for of clearly definedclearly-defined user/resource boundaries and or (clearly 250 
defined water use rights) that could be used to increase robustnesswshould lead to robust 251 
institutionsal arrangements. Second, we employed a the two-level stage pairwise ranking of the 252 
conditions following the Analytic Hierarchy Process; a method for decision making analysis 253 
introduced by Saaty (1990). Fwherein the first stage-level pairwise comparisons allowed us to 254 
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weight each criterion, and the s. Second-level stage pairwise comparisons allowed us to 255 
determine how much the fuzzy-set complied with each criterion. The resultant pairwise 256 
comparison matrixes had a consistency ratio of CR ≤ 0.1, meaning that the priority ranking of 257 
the fuzzy-sets were was consistent, and therefore acceptable (Saaty, 2008). 258 
3.6. Systematic coding 259 
Next, a coding system was developed in Nvivo based on the fuzzy sub-sets listed in Table A1 260 
of the Appendix. We conducted content analysis on the 62 cases, and each case was coded 261 
according to the fuzzy definitions. A memo was linked to a case whose content did not directly 262 
comply with the fuzzy-set, but where the meaning was implied throughout the article. In these 263 
cases, the data was coded accordingly. The memo also included citation details from other 264 
supporting documents to supplement information from the main case study article. Where 265 
possible (and necessary) additional information was obtained via personal communication with 266 
case- study authors to clarify ambiguous dataissues in the articles. All coding was conducted 267 
by the first author and, hence,, requiring no inter-coder reliability tests were required. In 268 
recognition of the fact that this could result in coder bias, however, we developed However, a 269 
set of strict procedures to minimize the risk that this could occur as detailed in the 270 
Supplementary Materials to this paper, were closely followed to ensure minimal bias by the 271 
coder.. Finally, we treated some missing data as ‘absent’, and coded these using the lowest 272 
score in the fuzzy-set.  273 
We provide some further explanation for this in the results section. 274 
3.7. Calibration of the fuzzy-set scores 275 
Using indirect methods of calibration recommended by Ragin (2006), we transformed the 276 
initial fuzzy-set score into one of four values. A full membership value of 1 was assigned to a 277 
fuzzy-set with the highest score, indicating the most favourable manifestation of the 278 
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governance institutionalarrangement criteria. A membership value of 0 was assigned to fuzzy-279 
set with the lowest scores, indicating the worst manifestation of the the governance 280 
arrangement criteriainstitutional criteriaoutcomes. The A challenge of with fuzzy concepts was 281 
is that it is difficult to justify the cross over (threshold) point,; therefore we doid not assign 0.5 282 
values to in the fuzzy-sets. Furthermore, cases with maximum ambiguity (i.e. 0.5 of fuzzy 283 
values) cannot be dealt with in fs/QCA analysis (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014). Instead, with 284 
due consideration based on i) our theoretical and substantive knowledge of the empirical 285 
studies and ii) the distance in a compliance score between full- and non-member, intermediate 286 
scores were assigned based on values of 0.33 which indicated whether a governance 287 
arrangement was more out than in; and 0.67 for a governance arrangement that was more in 288 
than out (Basurto and Speer, 2012). The fuzzy-set values were then assigned to all cases in the 289 
fuzzy data matrix. 290 
Missing data and the meaning of zero “0”. 291 
3.8.  292 
Out of the 62 cases, there are 46 complete cases, while 16 cases contain missing data. Missing 293 
data exist mainly associated with the presence or absence evident in the discussion of of 294 
graduated sanction mechanisms (13 cases or 20%) and conflict resolution mechanisms (5 cases 295 
or 8%). All missing data were coded initially coded at thewith a lowestzero fuzzy values 296 
whichthat resulted in “0” values in the truth table analysis. SHowever, some of the cases with 297 
missing data showed a ROBUST outcome. ThereforeTherefore, in a subsequent analysis, we 298 
chose to use the lowest fuzzy value since it is more interesting to explore why certain condition 299 
isthe absentce (or presumed to be absentce) canof these conditions might not have 300 
compromised a lead to the presence of theROBUST outcome s, rather than assuming thate  301 
presence of the condition increases robustness leading to the presence of outcome which has 302 
been establishedas typically discussed in the literature.  303 
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 Therefore, ahe “0” value in this study has three meanings, i.e. “truly absent” 304 
(when the condition was indeed absent), “not in the set” (missing data: when the condition was 305 
not specifically discussed mention in the case study, and is therefore ambiguous), and “not 306 
applicable” (which mainlythis is especially applyied forto nested conditions. , sSince most of 307 
the case studyies were small scale and there was no indication of itthem being part of a a 308 
complex or larger systeminstitutions, we suspect that in most cases graduated sanctions operate 309 
– even though there is no mention of them). All of these meanings canare be identified and 310 
explored in the solution path of sufficiency conditions discussed later.  311 
3.8.3.9. Data analysis 312 
Finally, we analyszed the data using fs/QCA v3.0, developed by Ragin and Davey (2017). 313 








The above formula simply reflects a hypothesiseized combination of DPs that may lead 315 
to robust water governance institutions. Capital letters denote that the conditions and outcomes 316 
are PRESENT in an irrigation systemarea. However, unlike a regression equation that would 317 
consist of dependent and independent variables, the fs/QCA model presents its causal 318 
conditions in the left left-hand side, and the outcome on the right. Further, the process involves 319 
Boolean operators as presented in Table 4: logical AND (*) which combines conditions (set 320 
intersect) to the smallest score, logical OR (+) which joins conditions (union set) to the highest 321 
score, and logical NOT (~) that signifies the negation of conditions or outcomes (ABSENT) 322 
(Ragin, 2009). 323 
 324 
 325 
Formatted: Indent: First line:  0.5", Tab stops: Not at 
1.22"
Formatted: Space After:  0 pt, Line spacing:  Double
Formatted Table




Table 4: Description of Boolean operators used in the study. 327 
Boolean operation Symbol Description 
Logical AND  * Combine condition (set intersect) to the smallest score  
Logical OR + Join condition (union set) to the highest score 
Logical NOT ~ Signify negation (absent) of condition or outcome 
 328 
Finally, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend that study data areis first 329 
analysed analyzed for necessary conditions before performing any analysis of sufficiency 330 
conditions. By necessary, this we means that whenever outcome Y is present, the condition X 331 
iwas also present. To address this requirement, a truth table was constructed from the fuzzy 332 
value matrix prior to sufficiency analysis. It contains rows of all possible combinations of 333 
causal conditions. We set the value of 1 for frequency cut-off to identify empirical relevant 334 
causal configuration, and 0.80 for consistency cut-off to determine which configuration pass 335 
the fuzzy-set theoretic consistency in the Quine-McCluskey minimiszation procedure (Ragin, 336 
2009). We then performed a standard analysis of the truth table for configuration of conditions 337 
that are sufficient for robust irrigation systeminstitutions. 338 
4. Results 339 
4.1.  Necessary conditions 340 
The results of the analysis in Table 5 show the consistency and coverage values are 341 
generally high for the presence of DPs in an irrigation systeminstitutions, suggesting good 342 
approximation of set-relations (Ragin, 2006) and the relevance of DPs for ROBUST outcomes. 343 
However, only four of the DPs pass the 0.9 consistency threshold value (Skaaning, 2011) for 344 
identification as necessary conditions; that is, BOUND, USERMON, SYSTMON, and RIGHT. 345 
Of those, BOUND also has the highest coverage value of 0.98 which indicates the relative 346 
importance of this condition compared to others. We also tested necessary conditions for failed 347 
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systems (~ROBUST), and found that only ~BOUND passed the consistency threshold with a 348 
value of 0.959 and coverage of 0.870; which is clearly not trivial. This again emphasiseizes the 349 
necessity of clearly defined boundaries for robust irrigation systemsinstitutions. 350 
 351 
Table 5: Analysis of necessary conditions for robust institutions (ROBUST) and failure 352 
(~ROBUST) outcome.. 353 
Condition Consistency Coverage  Condition Consistency Coverage 
BOUND 0.949 0.985  ~BOUND 0.087 0.221 
LOCCON 0.761 0.936  ~LOCCON 0.275 0.504 
BENCOST 0.862 0.880  ~BENCOST 0.167 0.441 
COLGOV 0.833 0.897  ~COLGOV 0.210 0.489 
USERMON 1.000 0.889  ~USERMON 0.014 0.062 
SYSTMON 0.971 0.950  ~SYSTMON 0.051 0.150 
GRADSAN 0.708 0.882  ~GRADSAN 0.307 0.552 
CONFRES 0.839 0.771  ~CONFRES 0.175 0.649 
RIGHTORG 1.000 0.889  ~RIGHTORG 0.014 0.062 
NESTEST 0.738 0.894  ~NESTEST 0.284 0.533 
              
ROBUST  ~ROBUST 
Condition Consistency Coverage  Condition Consistency Coverage 
BOUND 0.949 0.985  ~BOUND 0.960 0.871 
LOCCON 0.761 0.936  ~LOCCON 0.855 0.562 
BENCOST 0.862 0.880  ~BENCOST 0.672 0.635 
COLGOV 0.833 0.897  ~COLGOV 0.733 0.612 
USERMON 1.000 0.889  ~USERMON 0.653 1.000 
SYSTMON 0.971 0.950  ~SYSTMON 0.858 0.914 
GRADSAN 0.708 0.882  ~GRADSAN 0.735 0.474 
CONFRES 0.839 0.771  ~CONFRES 0.305 0.405 
RIGHT 1.000 0.889  ~RIGHT 0.652 1.000 
NESTEST 0.738 0.894  ~NESTEST 0.756 0.508 
             
Note: bold indicates passing the consistency threshold of 0.9 for a necessary condition. 354 
Next, following a process described in Goertz (2006), we create 2 x 2 tables to examine 355 
search forany sufficiency effects associated with of the four identified necessary conditions 356 
identified. According to this process, when the bottom right-hand cell (X, ~Y) is equal to zero, 357 
a necessary condition is maximally relevant to a sufficient condition. With regard to the DPs 358 
for the irrigation systems institutions included in our study, the results reported shown in Table 359 
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6 suggest that, while all of the necessary conditions identified have important sufficiency 360 
condition effects, none of them is sufficient on its own alone to produce the a ROBUST 361 
outcome. The bottom left-hand cells (~X,~X, ~Y) shows reasonable numbers of observations 362 
which indicateing that the necessary conditions are not trivial (Goertz 2006). Interestingly, only 363 
BOUND has a zero value in the bottom right cell (BOUND, ~ROBUST) which indicates that 364 
the cClearly definedclearly-defined boundary DP appears to be maximally relevant as a 365 
sufficient condition. However, the presence of two cases in the upper left cell (~BOUND, 366 
ROBUST) seems to contradicts the necessity finding reported above. The two deviant cases 367 
were the Nshara and Mkanyeni canals in Tanzania. In these cases, the users were known but 368 
water access and risk sharing were inequitable (fuzzy values of 0.33). Both irrigation systems 369 
were managed by ethnic groups with significant power asymmetry that lead to inequity in the 370 
rights to use water. However, despite theis inequality of access to water, the self-governing 371 
institutions in question had persisted for many generations. This finding agrees with Agrawal’s 372 
(2001) statement observation that hierarchical social arrangements in the distribution of 373 
benefits can be sustainable despite unfair inequitable access sharing, such as those of caste 374 
systems or areas with ethnic and/or racial inequality. Rohlfing and Schneider (2013) also 375 
suggest deviant cases can be the result of under-specification, i.e. omission of the SUIN 376 
condition, which stands for a ‘sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor, that is insufficient but 377 
necessary for an outcome’ (Mahoney et al., 2009). This finding suggests supports our decision 378 
tothat we should examine joined conditions, which and we will return to a consideration of that 379 
issue after some discussion of parsimonious solutions below. 380 
Table 6: Necessary conditions for robust irrigation system institutions 381 
Table 5a. BOUND  Table 5b. USERMON 
 ~BOUND BOUND   ~USERMON USERMON 
ROBUST 2 41  ROBUST 0 43 
~ROBUST 19 0  ~ROBUST 13 6 
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Table 5c. SYSTMON  Table 5d. RIGHT 
 ~SYSTMON SYSTMON   ~RIGHTRIGHT RIGHTRIGHT 
ROBUST 0 43  ROBUST 0 43 
~ROBUST 17 2  ~ROBUST 10 9 
       
 382 
4.2. Analysis of sufficiency conditions 383 
The results of the truth table analysis show there are seven configurations of conditions 384 
that are sufficient for ROBUST irrigation system governanceinstitutions, as presented in Figure 385 
3. The notation here follows Fiss (2011) and Ragin and Fiss (2008) who differentiate between 386 
core and peripheral or complementary conditions. Core conditions are those that appear in the 387 
parsimonious and the intermediate solutions, while peripheral conditions only appear in the 388 
intermediate solution (Fiss, 2011). Parsimonious solutions (Table 7) result from including both 389 
easy and difficult counterfactual arguments in the logical reminders for the truth table analysis, 390 
which in fs/QCA terms is the minimum configuration required for the ROBUST outcome to 391 
occur Other conditions added in the intermediate solution require simplifying assumptions 392 
based on easy counterfactuals alone; thus they are regarded as contributing or complementary 393 
conditions (Ragin and Fiss, 2008). The complete set of truth table results are available in Table 394 
A3 inof  the Appendix to this paper. 395 







USERMON*SYSTMON   or 0.971 0.231 0.978 
LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT 0.740        0 1.000 
Solution coverage: 0.971    
Solution consistency: 0.978    
 397 
 398 
Figure 3 shows two distinct groups of causal configurations. Group 1 relies on the first 399 
parsimonious solution, i.e. the combination of user monitoring AND system- wide monitoring 400 
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(USERMON*SYSTMON). The USERMON condition is considered present when monitoring 401 
of users has a strong enforcement capacity to ensure rule compliance. The SYSTMON 402 
condition denotes that a comprehensive monitoring of water resource conditions and status is 403 
in place, and results are accessible to all in a timely manner. These characteristics allow the 404 
systems and users to adjust as local circumstances vary. Interestingly, in cases where clear 405 
GRADSAN or CONFRES conditions—which are considered important in successful CPR 406 
management—are uncertain, USERMON AND SYSTMON conditions consistently appear. 407 
The paths that treat GRADSAN as ‘don’t care’ reflect data that may be present or absent in the 408 
case study but result in the same outcome. Sufficient conditions that include ~GRADSAN 409 
(i.e.  absence of graduated sanctions) are shared by groups of cases that have either i) i) high 410 
mutual trust within the community (such as irrigation systems institutions found in 411 
Chaisombat, Nishikanbara LID, Shirgin, Tharigat watershed, Ghayl, and Zanjera Danum), ii) 412 
or ii) high control over water allocation mechanisms (Falaj Al Khatmeen, Nabargram, Sidi 413 
Okba), or iii) both. These cases include evidence of minimum conflict and free- rider problems, 414 
which may suggest reasons as to why the authors did not discuss this DP in detail—and as such 415 
may be treated coded as missing data in our analysis. However, in the Nishikanbara in Japan 416 
and Ghayl in Yemen cases, the authors discuss the role of social norms and mutual trust that 417 
prevent users from free riding. All other cases with ~GRADSAN characteristics display failure 418 
(~ROBUST) in the outcome. Similar missing/absent data outcomes in our analysis also applied 419 





Figure 3: Sufficient configurations of conditions for robust irrigation institutions (intermediate 423 
solution) 424 
Group 2 (2a and 2b) relies on the second parsimonious solution; the combination of 425 
cCongruence with local condition AND sSystem wide system-wide monitoring AND 426 
mMinimum rights to organiseize (LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT) as decisive factors in the 427 











Raw coverage 0.520 0.447 0.337 0.433 0.315 0.066 0.080
Unique coverage 0.117 0.029 0.008 0.008 0.022 0.059 0.008
Consistency 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Solution coverage 0.689
Solution consistency 1.000
       denotes core condition (present),       denotes complementary or contributing condition (present),      denotes
complementary condition (absent), blank spaces indicate "don't care" situation where a condition could be present 
or absent. Cov= coverage; Con = consistency. 
Cov: 0.74; Con: 1.000Cov: 0.71; Con: 0.978
Conditions
Solution paths for robust institution
USERMON*SYSTMON LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHTORG











Raw coverage 0.520 0.447 0.337 0.433 0.315 0.066 0.080
Unique coverage 0.117 0.029 0.008 0.008 0.022 0.059 0.008
Consistency 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Solution coverage 0.689
Solution consistency 1.000
       denotes core condition (present),       denotes complementary or contributing condition 
(present),       denotes complementary condition (absent), blank spaces indicate "don't care"
situation where a condition could be present or absent.
Conditions
Solution paths for robust institution
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configuration. That is, when users have the authority to self-organiseize and devise operational 428 
rules within a defined framework (RIGHT), they can adapt to various conditions as they change 429 
(LOCCON) provided they have required information about relevant resources at the right time 430 
(SYSTMON). The solution paths for Group 2 treat the BOUND condition as ‘don’t care’, as 431 
the presence or absence of that condition both result in the ROBUST outcome. In these cases, 432 
the LOCCON condition becomes essential in the configuration. Solution 2a belongs to small 433 
communities in Tanzania (Nshara) and Nepal (Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo) where conflict 434 
resolution is missing (~CONFRES). The importance of conflict resolution mechanisms was 435 
clearly mentioned in the case studyiesy introduction material, but then not discussed in the case 436 
study findings. However, Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo both displayed evidence of having installed 437 
devices that tracked water distribution more precisely, as a means to reduce conflict (Martin 438 
and Yoder, 1988)., while in Nshara furrow irrigators adopted equity and fairness principles to 439 
prevent conflict (GiilinghamGillingham 1999).  440 
 441 
4.3. Tests of joined conditions 442 
The results above show that all of the conditions which passed the consistency threshold 443 
of the necessary condition analysis are were also present in the parsimonious solution paths—444 
except BOUND. However, despite being present in the solution paths for both Groups, which 445 
should indicate its’ necessity, LOCCON did not pass the original consistency threshold test. 446 
This brings us back the issue of SUIN conditions mentioned previously. We hypothesiseize 447 
that both BOUND and LOCCON are SUIN conditions, and that their union 448 
(BOUND+LOCCON) may reveal whether they are individually unnecessary or insufficient for 449 
ROBUST institutional outcomes, but constitute shared rules necessary for ROBUST irrigation 450 
system governanceinstitutions. To test this hypothesishypothesis, we use the enhanced XY plot 451 
Formatted: Indent: First line:  0.5", Space After:  0 pt,
Line spacing:  Double
27 
 
(Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013) to determine whether these two conditions can be treated as 452 
SUIN conditions. All XY plots were created using Tosmana v1.6 (Cronqvist, 2018). 453 
Figure 4a maps the distribution of cases between the BOUND condition and ROBUST 454 
outcome to show that, despite being highly relevant with zero cases in Cell 3 (see the centre of 455 
figures for cell numbering references), the two deviant cases in Cell 6 contradict the necessity 456 
of the BOUND condition as discussed previously. Figure 4b maps the distribution of cases 457 
between the LOCCON condition and ROBUST outcomes showing that Cell 1 contains 30 cases 458 
which exclude the LOCCON condition from achieving necessity status, notwithstanding it 459 
being present in all of the solution paths. This suggests that, consistent with SUIN principles, 460 
the presence of LOCCON ensures ROBUST outcomes in cases such as Nshara and Mkanyeni 461 
where the BOUND condition is absent. However, the SUIN condition means that cases without 462 




Figure 4a: Enhanced XY plot of 
BOUND condition 
 Figure 4b: Enhanced XY plot of 
LOCCON condition 
Unlike the rigid irrigation governance systems in Mendoza, both Mkanyeni and Nshara 464 
have flexible working rules for water appropriation including allowing the limited transfer of 465 
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shares and/or allocation.1 This allows them to reduce some of the inequality dimension between 466 
users, supporting the persistence of the institutions for long periods of time. A direct 467 
comparison between these cases might not be appropriate, however, since the irrigation system 468 
in Mendoza is larger and more complex compared to the small scale irrigation systems 469 
institutions of Mkanyeni and Nshara. Nevertheless, we consider that However, comparison 470 
here is justified on the basis that the three systems cases were awarded membership in the same 471 
fuzzy value category,; which that is, is more in that out of the BOUND condition, even though 472 
they display different outcomes. An additional analysis of the SUIN consistency and coverage 473 
values for BOUND+LOCCON reveals a consistency value of 0.978, which suggests that the 474 
SUIN condition is necessary. The , and a coverage of 0.936 which also indicates, also, that it 475 
is not trivial. Although Figure 5 shows that there are six cases in Cell 3 that reduce the 476 
sufficiency effect, it does not contradict the necessary condition evaluation (Goertz, 2006; 477 
Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013). This implies that while it is necessary, the SUIN condition 478 
alone is not sufficient to achieve ROBUST irrigation system institutions. Figure 5 also shows 479 
that there is a deviant case in Cell 1, but the outcome can still be explained by the presence of 480 
the condition. 481 
                                                 
1 In Nshara, temporary transfer took place within the same irrigation system with neighbours or relatives, 
providing that whoever borrowed or bought water (although selling water was considered illegal) also participated 
in maintenance activities. To reduce risk and inequality of water access, farmers in Mkanyeni located their plots 




Figure 51Figure 5: Enhanced XY plot of 
BOUND+LOCCON conditions 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 482 
One way to test the robustness of fsQCA analysis is to reduce the number of cases (de Bora et 483 
al 2016). We therefore, therefore, re-ruan the analysies using complete case studies only, to 484 
and founddiscover that GRADSAN and CONFRES are also necessary for ROBUST outcomes. 485 
The result is expected sincebecause, as discussed earlier, these two conditions arewere usually 486 
the source of missing data. The test for ~ROBUST havealso returned consistent results showing 487 
that only ~BOUND is necessary. Likewise, the truth table analysis showsindicates that the 488 
parsimonious solutions areremained the same, while the intermediate solutions showsed only 489 
four configurations in Figure 3, i.e.; that is, 1a, 1c, 1e, and 2b. As a result, we consider that 490 
This indicates there is no reason to question the reliability of our resultsfindings as a result of 491 
the presence of some missing dataat the results of theour analysis isare generally reliable. For 492 
further detail, readers are directed to the(Please refer to sensitivity analysis section in the 493 




5. Discussion 495 
The results reported above support Ostrom’s view that no list of DPs, if complied with, is likely 496 
to be  would be necessary and sufficient for sufficient to ensure institutional robustness 497 
governance arrangements. But fFor the irrigation systems institutions included in the study, 498 
however, it has been possible to identify a set of four necessary conditions which increase lead 499 
to robustness outcomes: these areat is, clearly definedclearly-defined boundaries, user 500 
monitoring, system-wide monitoring, and minimum rights to organiseize. The seven 501 
configurations of conditions that appear to be sufficient for robustness robust ROBUST 502 
outcomes agree with previous studies that have found that not all DPs haved to be present in 503 
successful CPR management (e.g. Baggio et al., 2016b). The configuration of causal conditions 504 
is context specific. Our findings are c, but also consistent, however, with Ostrom’s (2009) view 505 
that the presence of more design principles in a self-organising organizing institution will 506 
increases robustness the probability of robust institutions. However, tThe solution path to 2bB, 507 
however, needs to be treated with cautiousn as it. It  includes the absence of proportional benefit 508 
and cost as a pathway to the robustness outcomes. Three cases in this group, (i.e. Valencia, 509 
Bada sSpate irrigation and Mkanyeni,) all have full cost recovery ‘but the distribution of 510 
benefits was generally inequitableunequal’ (fuzzy value 0.33). This perhapspossibly indicates 511 
that the calibration for calibrating thise concept need to be treated asrequires treatments of 512 
‘more in than out’ (0.67), in which the design principle includes the concept of cost recovery 513 
that distributed proportionally to the benefit received by the users.   In traditional irrigation 514 
systems, cost recovery typically is not a major big issue as most since the irrigation 515 
infrastructures are were built from simple structures using cheap from surrounding materials 516 
sourced from the surrounding landscape, and are thus easier to maintain with labour and in-517 
kind contribution by the farming community.  to perform wellFor example, iirrigation 518 
institutions delivery may be achieved via ingiessurrounding  By contrast, modern irrigation 519 
Formatted: Space After:  0 pt, Line spacing:  Double
31 
 
delivery systems may be  on the other hand, is capital intensive, where the cost of operating 520 
and maintaining such systems may not which cannot simply be resolved by in-kind and labour 521 
contributions from by farmers. This would indicate Which is why the low -cost recovery has 522 
been thea concern of thefor modern irrigation institutions, especially in the developing 523 
countries (Sampath, 1992). 524 
The results also found two minimum alternative configurations that consistently appear 525 
present in robust institutions characterizsed by robustness. As can be seen , and which are 526 
presented in the parsimonious solutions mentioned above,. T the causal conditions in the 527 
parsimonious solutions mirror the necessary conditions except for that of clearly 528 
definedclearly-defined boundaries and congruence with local conditions, which we identify as 529 
SUIN conditions (discussed below). Given that this study has highlighted the importance of 530 
some DPs including clear user and resource boundaries, rules that are congruent with local 531 
conditions, monitoring of both users and the resource system, and local rights to organiseize—532 
and the relevance of these DPs as alternative pathways to success— that have appeared we 533 
expand upon each of those with some additional examples and detail from the case study 534 
materials. 535 
5.1. Clearly definedClearly-defined boundaries and congruent appropriation rules as SUIN 536 
conditions. 537 
In the face of future scarcity and unpredictability, robust water governance institutions 538 
must include volve CPR property-right structures that are secure yet flexible adaptable enough 539 
to accommodate support change in the systems, while providing incentives for users to invest 540 
in maintaining their the resource and, also the parts of itthe system that are under their control 541 
system (Howe et al., 1986; Quiggin, 1988). Clearly definedClearly-defined user/resource 542 
boundaries and congruent appropriation rules both represent the requisite property rights 543 
structure. In our case studies, typical appropriation rules reflect the boundary definition of the 544 
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resource setting: who gets water, when, where, how much and for what use are the shared rules 545 
that clearly definedclearly and completely define the boundary of the resource system, and at 546 
the same time clearly guided the development of  working rules that enable efficient and 547 
equitable for appropriation. Further, all of the ROBUST outcomes cases displayed some degree 548 
of security and flexibility in their institutional arrangements. These two characteristics do not 549 
necessarily contradict one other; rather the irrigation community usually managed to design 550 
shared access arrangements which allowed users to adapt to changes in supply while respecting 551 
the assignment of longer-term the property rights structures (e.g. annual scarcity pressures can 552 
be managed separately from longer-term considerations). 553 
Two types of flexibility are typically discussed in the literature, and appear in the cases. 554 
First, Ostrom (1990) emphasizses the congruence of appropriation rules with local conditions 555 
where water is allocated in response to the changing water availability either by rotation or 556 
turn-taking, reducing water proportionally, or assigning different use priorities under different 557 
situations. Second, there may be flexibility in the way that longer-term opportunities to access 558 
water can be transferred to other uses or users, or from one place to another, as climate, 559 
demographic and economic conditions change over time (Howe et al., 1986) and the system 560 
must adapt to cope. Table  78 lists provides some examples of these differences between failed 561 
and robust irrigation systems. 562 
Table 78: Comparison of failed and robust surface and groundwater irrigation systems 563 
 Failed Systems Robust Systems 
Surface water Kuhl Tharigat watersedwatershed 
Access to water Priority of water in kuhls are given to 
paddy farmers. (Water use right to 
kharif is formally registered/ 
documented). 
Ten villages shared water in the 
Tharigat watershed according to a pre-
agreed scheduleing. 
Sharing rules at system 
level 
Clear among kuhls irrigation before 
new entrants started using water in 
the upper and middle reaches of the 
irrigation system. 
Clear time sharing and rotation 
schedule for water allocation for each 
village. 
Source of change in the 
access to water 
New entrant: : new rice fields in the 
upper stream. 
New entrant: government takes water 
from the river in the upper stream to 
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supply drinking water to the nearby 
city. 
Impact or respondse to 
change in access to water- 
Uncontrolled use of water at the 
upper stream. Useless downstream 
water rights because irrigation ran 
dry/system became non-operational. 
Water supply decreased significantly. 
Re-arranged water time sharing and 
rotation is organised for each village. 
Proportional rReduction of cultivated 
area proportionally. 
Surface water Mendoza Valencia (Old) 
Access to water Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
right is attached to land. 
Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
right is attached to land. 
Sharing rules at system 
level 
Proportional ownership. Proportional ownership. 
Respondse to water 
shortage/ scarcity 
Rotation; Proportional proportional 
reduction irrespective of different 
needs. 
Applied different priority in short 
term, long term and emergency 
planning based on equity principles; 
proportional reduction. 
Impact on access to water Unable to respond to scarcity or 
drought. Increased illegal pumping 
by big farmers to augment water 
supply. 
Different strategy of water allocation 
allows the system to achieve efficiency 
while still maintaining equity 
principles.  
Groundwater Gnangara aquifer system Eastern La Mancha aquifer system 
Access to water 10-year fixed annual entitlement. The 
licencsing system specified an 
authoriseized use or purpose to which 
extracted water is to be put. Water 
rights are transferable. 
Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
is attached to land.  
Respondse to water 
scarcity 
Variability of water resource 
condition is not considered; 
information on water condition not 
readily available.  
Reduction of abstraction volume per 
hectare to increase water level in the 
aquifer as agreed by farmers’ 
association and water authority. 
Impact on water resources Water overdraft, water resource 
degradation  
Water levels still show downward 
trend but farmers’ association and 
water authority are building a solid 
institutional framework in which to 
introduce sustainable practices. 
 564 
Whichever sharing/appropriation rule mechanisms apply, there are two main lessons 565 
that can be derived from the case studies. First, water water-sharing arrangements at the system 566 
level must be in place prior to the need to change allocation arrangements changes occurrsing. 567 
Second, while a sense of equity in maintaining user resource sharing in CPR management is 568 
important (Quiggin, 1993), in practice the distribution arrangements must be allowed to evolve. 569 
Therefore, it is critical to establish individual water use rights that are clearly definedclearly-570 
defined and difficult to contest. Only bythrough gaining secure access to water will users be 571 
willing to invest in the operation and maintenance of the system, and to ensure productive use 572 
of the irrigation system resources over time. The case studies also assist us to understand how 573 




robust governance arrangementsinstitutions emerge as a consequence of these conditions. 574 
Spate irrigation systems in Eritrea (Ghebremariam and van Steenbergen, 2007; Mehari et al., 575 
2005) have existed for many generations despite unequal access to water. Since this the 576 
irrigation systems institutions rely relies on access to seasonal floods, water supply is highly 577 
uncertain and unpredictable. As a result, requiring complex arrangements for water 578 
appropriation are mixed with other social mechanisms to ensure the community members 579 
perceived the rules as fair. This has ensured resulted in continued farmer membership in the 580 
resultant collective CPR collectivemanagement institutions. Similarly, in Valencia, the 581 
irrigation community maintained equality of access through proportional appropriation rules, 582 
and applied different access priorities as conditions changed to ensure fair access perceptions 583 
by users (Glick, 1970; Maass and Anderson, 1978). Alternatively, Barnett et al. (2016) provide 584 
evidence of how the application of proportional access in two groundwater -based irrigation 585 
systems in Spain became incongruent with the broader economic, social and technological 586 
conditions surrounding the system, causing the institutionsal system to fail. This highlights the 587 
relevance of local conditions for robust outcomes, and the importance of flexible property 588 
rights structures, as suggested by Quiggin (1988), into keeping the appropriation rules 589 
congruent with the nature of the characteristics of the physical resource and social demands on 590 
it. 591 
5.2. User and system-wide monitoring 592 
The parsimonious solutions in Table 7 shows that the raw coverage of 593 
USERMON*SYSTMON is comparatively higher than LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT. In 594 
addition, it has a a unique coverage of 0.231 which shows that around 23% of the cases can be 595 
explained by this recipesolution alone, without the need for others recipe. Based on these two 596 
features, the USERMON*SYSTMON solution ismay therefore, therefore, be considered more 597 
important than the LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT solution. However, i 598 
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It is important to note that the concept used for monitoring of users and resources in our 599 
systematic coding wereas slightly different tofrom  that of Cox et al. (2010). While separating 600 
‘monitoring of users’ (DP4A) andfrom the ‘monitoring theof resources’ (DP4B) in their 601 
modifiedcation of the design principlesDPs (see Table 1), Cox et al. (2010) suggest that they 602 
indicate explanation indicate the presence of monitoring for both users and resources in DP4A, 603 
andwhile DP4B is theindicates any accountability of the monitors in the institutions.2. The same 604 
approach was used by Baggio et al (2016). In our view, keeping the two types of monitoring 605 
types included in DP4A separate (as in Table 1) is more beneficial in helping to search for and 606 
find ways toof increasinge the infor analyszing robustness of irrigation institutions, sinceas 607 
they serve different purposes. In our view, cCombining the monitoring of individual user 608 
behaviour s and with the benefits of reporting on the status of the entire resources together in 609 
DP4A mightmay is about two separate issues undermine the importance of resource 610 
monitoring, which may in turnthat run the risk of being  be and ignoredoverlook by researchers 611 
when investigating CPRs using Ostroms’sOstrom’s design principleDPs. , as found in some of 612 
the case studies.  613 
In support of this view, we found evidence of such oversight in some of the case studies. 614 
In ; for example, Tthe case in Kenya (Likii WRUA) and two cases in China (Wang and Wen 615 
villages), for example provide example. In these three cases,, the authors clearly identified the 616 
presence of monitoring (focusing on users and the status of use), and that the monitors were 617 
accountable to users. However, despite the presence of all DPs according to the authors, they 618 
observed significant inequality between users (in all cases), the difficulties toin copeing with 619 
changed in socioecological conditions (Likii WRUA), and over exploitation of water resources 620 
                                                 
2 “Principle 4A stipulates the presence of monitors, whereas 4B stipulates the condition that 
these monitors are members of the community or otherwise accountable to those members.” 
(Cox et al 2010: Principle 4: Monitoring). However, the authors reviewed the importance of 








(Wang and Wen villages). These three cases indicate two thingsimportant points: 1i) there can 621 
be a lack of enforcement despite the presence of accountable monitors and monitoring the 622 
users/resources;, and ii) 2) if resource monitoring does not exist, or the information cannot be 623 
accessed in a timely manner to adapt to the social-ecological change, failure is more likely. We 624 
coded these three systems as ‘fragile’. TBy contrastIn addition, the comparison, of he 625 
comparison between two the two groundwater -based irrigation systeminstitutions in Table 8 626 
showsindicate how monitoring of, and timely available information on, resource conditions 627 
clearly contribute to robust institutions. Therefore,  628 
Eestablishing an effective individual use monitoring system is important so that 629 
aspiring, but ineligible users, users can be excluded and that , also, so that allocations, once 630 
made, are complied with.  631 
Different from other types of CPR where failure of the system tends to may give impact 632 
all to the resource users in the same way, often weak water institutions involve adverse has 633 
unidirectional impacts  where the actions of different communities in the upstream users can 634 
impose unfair and socially inefficient impacts on and downstream usersshare unequal risk of 635 
floods and  – especially during short-term water scarcity. This is particularly was evident 636 
infrom the three ‘fragile’ cases mentioned above. Separate system-wide monitoring should 637 
ensure equitable sharing of the available resource and, . Aat the broader level under effective 638 
enforcement rules, that eligible downstream users are able to  also have to be in place so that 639 
access to the total resource that is available for use can be shared. At the system level, the 640 
governance and allocation system chosen should have the capacity to enforce sharing rules, 641 
ensure that eligible users exercise their rights while not violating others; thus preventing , and 642 
prevent any type of infringement upon the common property resource. Further, Thus, an 643 
effective user monitoring not only need accountability but also enforcement capacity of the 644 
monitors to maintain order and prevent opportunistic behaviour of the competing users. 645 
37 
 
In addition, resource monitoring is essential for effective planning and decision -646 
making in natural resource management contexts (Babu and Reidhead, 2000). The flFinally, 647 
the flexibileity of appropriation and provision rules discussed above critically depend on timely 648 
information from the monitoring process, which will inform the need for . Comprehensive 649 
monitoring will ensure the ability of the system and users to adapt to various conditions as they 650 
change. ImportantlyIn support of this conclusion, all of the FAIL cases in this study did not 651 
havehad no proper monitoring systems in place, nor was use infringement or system condition 652 
information easily accessible in a timely manner.  653 
5.2.  654 
As we have shown, the persistent of irrigation system institutions is partly determined 655 
by the presence of monitoring systems—both of users and of the system itself (e.g. resource 656 
and infrastructure conditions). Establishing an effective individual use monitoring system is 657 
important so that aspiring, but ineligible users, can be excluded and, also, so that allocations, 658 
once made are complied with. Separate system-wide monitoring systems also have to be in 659 
place so that access to the total resource that is available for use can be shared. At the system 660 
level, the governance and allocation system chosen should have the capacity to enforce sharing 661 
rules, ensure that eligible users exercise their rights while not violating others, and prevent any 662 
type of infringement upon the common property resource. In addition, resource monitoring is 663 
essential for effective planning and decision making in natural resource management contexts 664 
(Babu and Reidhead, 2000). The flexibility of appropriation and provision rules discussed 665 
above critically depend on timely information from the monitoring process. Comprehensive 666 
monitoring will ensure the ability of the system and users to adapt to various conditions as they 667 
change. Importantly, all of the FAIL cases in this study did not have proper monitoring systems 668 
in place, nor was use infringement or system condition information easily accessible in timely 669 
manner. 670 
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5.3. Combining congruence principles, system wide system-wide monitoring and the right to 671 
organiseize to aspire adaptive capacityMinimum recognition of rights to organise 672 
WAs outlined above, water is unique compared to other types of natural resources , with . 673 
Water has multiple values and uses. Ias it tends tot flows from upstream to downstream, with 674 
can thus can have sequential use and re-use values, and extremes in terms of quantity, quality 675 
and time of impacti; its supply also varies in supply in terms of time, place and quality 676 
(Hanemann, 2006). It has destructive power during floods, or can create severe competition in 677 
a long drought. These features make water management is more challenging, especially where 678 
management and requireds rapid adaptation.  679 
The second parsimonious solution which combinesd congruence of appropriation and 680 
provision rules with local conditions, system monitoring and the minimum right to organiseize 681 
(LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT) inspiresrepresents a pathway to increased adaptive capacity, 682 
and through this system robustness.  Consistent with acting upon the information provided 683 
from an effective monitoring system, institutional successful CPR management necessitates 684 
active group management with the authority to hold members in check over their use of system 685 
resources (Bromley, 1992). Most importantly, these arrangements must also be capable of 686 
responding to dynamic changes in economic, social and environmental conditions at particular 687 
times and places as rapidly as these changes occur with rapid adaptation. To achieve rapid 688 
adaptation, authority appears to be best left with the local users/managers since they are more 689 
familiar to the local context and directly face the immediate changes or problems (Cundill and 690 
Fabricius, 2009) but these authorities need to be nested within robust system-wide structures.  691 
In all irrigation systems, the the minimum information required on time istypically 692 
includes access to continuously updated information on the quantity of water available ility for 693 
the irrigation so that the community and individuals canto  plan for water allocation and use, 694 
and, also, maintain the condition of irrigation infrastructure in a for timely mannerintenance 695 
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purposeahead of that allocation and use. The more complex the irrigation delivery system and 696 
generally the larger it is, the more important the system-wide monitoring istofor adapting to 697 
changed socioecological conditions as they change. Table 8 shows how robust 698 
systeminstitutions make used of the information to respond and adapt to various changes ofin 699 
water condition including how they; that is,, i.e.  adjusting the working rules to keep itmaintain 700 
congruence with the local conditions over time (as discussed earlier). InBy comparison, in 701 
institutions in the system where information paucity is not readily available to preventes 702 
timelyd  adaptation and response to socio-ecological change, or where links to larger irrigation 703 
systems outside of operating boundaries prevented local modification of operational rules or 704 
the system has lack authority to modified their operational rules since it is connected to the 705 
larger system which is beyond their boundary (in case of e.g. the Kuhl case study), lead to the 706 
declining of the systeminstitutional decline or failure is was the typical outcome. Our analysis 707 
finding thatof RIGHT design principles asconstitute a necessary condition for robust outcomes 708 
is highly consistent with these arrangementsoutcomes. Local decision-making, however, is 709 
only part of the issuesolution;. T there is a need to also incorporate wider political, economic 710 
and environmental information into the local decision-making process and prevent resource 711 
users in one part of the system having impacts on other parts of the system in a manner that is 712 
inconsistent with agreed system-wide rules. ThusThat isus, the right to organiseize locally 713 
should not compromise the shared rules at the system level.  714 
5.4. Proposed design principle modifications 715 
Our analysis of 62 irrigation systems corroborates Cox et al.’s (2010) deduction 716 
conclusion that Ostrom’s DPs are well supported by empirical evidence. The In this study, the 717 
fs/QCA approach proved to be useful for examining institutional arrangements with respect to 718 
each of the design principles in more detail; . However, it also allowed us to identify certain 719 
necessary conditions and the minimumalternative configurations of causal conditions that 720 
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would could lead to a robust irrigation institutions. Based on this analysis, we are in a position 721 
to recommend suggest some further irrigation-system focused enhancements modifications to 722 
Ostrom’s DPs (Table 89) with respect to ongoing congruence (DP 2A), the linking of 723 
monitoring to enforcement arrangements (DP 4A), and the clearer reporting responsibility by 724 
system monitors to system users—rather than monitoring alone (Table 8) that could be applied 725 
to all other irrigation CPRs as a test of their usefulness more generally.. 726 
  727 
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Table 89: Proposed further modifications to Ostrom’s DPs for broad application 728 
 Three DPs as listed in Ostrom (2010)  Modified DPs based on the comparative 
analysis 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: 
Appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local social and 
environmental conditions. 
Congruence with Local Conditions: 
Appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent and is expected to remain 
congruent with current, and flexible 
enough to cope with future local and 
system-wide social and environmental 
conditions as they change.  
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are 
accountable to or are the users monitor 
the appropriation and provision levels 
of the users. 
Monitoring Users: Monitors are accountable 
to the users with enforcement capacity 
necessary to for ensuring compliance 
with the agreed appropriation and use 
rules 
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals 
who are accountable to or are the users 
monitor the condition of the resource. 
System-wide monitoring: System-wide 
monitoring and reporting exists and is 
reported to users in a timely manner.  
 729 
Consistent with Ostrom’s desire to test theory with empirical data in this space, we have 730 
therefore, therefore, offered these modifications for application and testing by scholars whose 731 
work aims to increase the assessment by in future irrigation CPR studies in for the assessment 732 
of robustness of irrigation CPR governance systemsinstitutions. We would be interested to see 733 
tests of necessity and sufficiency in other CPR settings to determine any common DP 734 
conditions or the identification of additional alternative solution pathways that emerge. Such 735 
research would bring us closer to the objectives set out by Ostrom for determining if the DPs 736 
continue to stand the test of time—as we hope future water governance systems institutions 737 
will. 738 
6. Concluding Comments 739 
The design of water governance and allocation systems remains an art and, while many get to 740 
write about opportunities to improve them, very few people are invited to participate in their 741 
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renewal; especially when the necessary changes involve the significant re-specification of the 742 
processes and institutional arrangements that determine who gets access to water. Moreover, 743 
in the real world of water governance and allocation, there is an immense amount of detail that 744 
never gets written down. Our aim, however, was to search for insights that can be used to 745 
convince communities that the current suite of arrangements institutions used to manage their 746 
water resources are flawed, can be fixed and, if fixed, will help to deliver prosperity. The 747 
collection of Evidence evidence from 62 many case studies across a substantial number of 37 748 
countries is one way of doing this. The results, which emerged from a careful examination of 749 
a fuzzy set of data, identified a) four necessary conditions; b) seven solution path 750 
configurations; and, perhaps more importantly, c) a union of conditions that, when absent, are 751 
likely to result in system failure during times of stress and/or when demands for access are 752 
shifting.  753 
The approach taken attempts to deal, as objectively as possible, with the need for 754 
concrete advice in a world where, at best, the concepts are fuzzy and situation specific. We 755 
have aimed, as objectively as possible, to come up with a suite of recommendations that cwould 756 
assist in the transformation of a failing systems into ones that could confidently be described 757 
as robust, and also for changes that can be made in order to ensure that systems thatwhich are 758 
currently performing well continue to do so. That is, we aspire to the development of 759 
institutional arrangements that those reliant upon the system’s water resources can ould be 760 
confident will that it would serve them well, especially in times of stress and as new demands 761 
emerge. The recommended enhancements modifications of three of Ostrom’s DPs adds a new 762 
temporal dimension to her work; added emphasis to on the importance of attending to flexible 763 
appropriation arrangements designed to facilitate in the face of uncertain change and, also, 764 
stressing the importance of monitoring both system-wide and individual use conditions. Our 765 
suggested enhancements modifications also identify a need to understand how design 766 
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principles interact with one another. Robustness is enhanced by arrangements that, for example, 767 
understand the interdependence of monitoring at differencet scales, allocation arrangements 768 
and enforcement capacity. 769 
Finally, the research reported here is reliant on the development of analytical techniques 770 
that seek to reduce arbitrariness. All the judgements made are summariseized in the 771 
aAppendicesx and Supplementary Material attached to this paper. When it comes to 772 
methodology, the highly skewed nature of the data collected suggests a need for more fine-773 
grained analysis. At the moment, the best that we can do is identify relationships among 774 
between broad, very fuzzy, concepts. Much more research is needed, for example, on concepts 775 
like “enforcement capacity;” “appropriation and use rule” options; and ways to ensure that 776 
“appropriation and provision rules are congruent with current, and are expected to remain 777 
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Robust irrigation system institutions: A global comparison 1 
1. Introduction 2 
There are many examples of common property regimes (CPRs) such as fishery, forestry, 3 
pasture and water supply that involve collective self-governance arrangements. Within that list 4 
of CPRs, small-scale irrigation water institutions often provide effective self-governance 5 
exemplars that are long-lasting (e.g. Janssen and Anderies, 2013). Shepsle (1989) defines long-6 
lasting institutions as robust, especially where operational rules are devised and modified over 7 
an extended period so that desired system characteristics remain. Robust water governance 8 
institutions persist because, under duress, they are able to produce efficient, socially-acceptable 9 
outcomes (Young, 2014). 10 
An issue for future robust water governance is that many current institutions were 11 
established during eras when there was abundant supply (Randall, 1981; Turton, 1999; Wheeler 12 
et al., 2017; Young, 2014). Increased water demand and rapid environmental change is testing 13 
those institutional arrangements, leading to concerns about future water crises (World 14 
Economic Forum, 2019) and attempts to identify robust water policy and institutional reforms 15 
(Gruère and Le Böedec, 2019). In an effort to identify institutional arrangements that would 16 
result in best outcomes for CPR Ostrom (1990) provided a list of design principles (DPs) based 17 
on common findings from detailed case studies of 80 irrigation and fishery institutions. The 18 
DPs included factors that may improve the probability of collective action and robust water 19 
institutional arrangements in the face of scarcity and uncertainty. 20 
Collective action should be most prominent where property rights are shared equally 21 
among users in CPRs, although free-riding and rivalry problems may reduce collective 22 
organisation (Feeney et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). CPRs are different from open access 23 
resources to which no right of any kind is assigned (McKean, 1992; Quiggin, 1988), and their 24 
study can be traced back to the work of Gordon (1954) on an economic theory of fisheries. 25 
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Thus, CPRs are not private or public property; they are geographically confined resources 26 
(Dasgupta, 2005) that are subject to the rights of common use by a group of co-equal owners 27 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). Ostrom’s governance DPs for CPRs have been applied 28 
to the study of collective action and updated in response to criticism that they may be too 29 
general in nature (Cleaver, 2000). Original CPR research detailing institutional arrangements 30 
for successful governance outcomes include Wade (1989), Ostrom (1990) and Baland and 31 
Plateu (1996). These studies found that neither private nor state control determines the 32 
sustainability of CPRs, but rather success comes from the robustness of self-governing 33 
institutions and, in particular, their capacity to sustain productive use of a resource as 34 
conditions and demands change. Typically, these institutions are characterized by complex 35 
rules that allow members of a community to share access to the CPR. 36 
Ostrom’s principles have been widely applied to evaluate/diagnose the effectiveness of 37 
local CPRs (Cox et al., 2010), and to examine the co-occurrence or combination of DPs 38 
necessary for social and ecological success (Baggio et al., 2016). Her principles have also been 39 
used to assess case studies of success and failure in governance (Barnett et al., 2016), and the 40 
scope and scale limits of analytical approaches involving the use of synthesis, meta-analysis 41 
and validation methods (Ratajczyk et al., 2016). While these studies have therefore established 42 
measures of success across multiple CPRs (e.g. fishery, forestry and irrigation using 43 
presence/absence conditions), questions remain as to whether Ostrom’s CPR institutional DPs 44 
are necessary—or necessary and sufficient—conditions to ensure sustainability and long-lived 45 
robustness (Ostrom, 2009). Ostrom herself doubted that any list of DPs would be necessary 46 
and sufficient to ensure robustness, and this is supported by a general scan of the literature 47 
(Mahoney et al., 2009). To explore this question, we focus solely on an evaluation of irrigation 48 
institutions via the DPs to determine whether their institutional arrangements appear to be 49 
robust, fragile or prone to failure. These outcomes are particularly important factors for future 50 
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water governance arrangements under expectations of scarcity and uncertainty with respect to 51 
supply (Young 2014). Water is a unique resource that can be used multiple times, across 52 
multiple locations, making robust adaptation to future uncertainty challenging. Many water 53 
resources have an additional challenging characteristic. Water tends to flow in a single 54 
direction with the consequence that the impacts of (ab)use tend to be uni-directional. Therefore, 55 
in this paper, we search for necessary conditions and explore whether there are 56 
groups/combinations/configurations of sufficient conditions that constitute alternative 57 
pathways to robust institutions in the field using a large-N case study approach. Based on our 58 
findings, we then offer some possible enhancements to Ostrom’s DPs in an attempt to assist 59 
others involved in searching for ways to improve the management of irrigation institutions, and 60 
the use of water. 61 
2. Theoretical framework 62 
The overarching basis for our study is the theory of collective action which seeks to understand 63 
what factors enable some groups to achieve difficult collective outcomes, while others fail 64 
(Ostrom, 2011). Consistent with a focus on empirical validation of resource governance 65 
institutions (Janssen and Anderies, 2013), we apply Ostrom’s DPs as updated by Cox et al. 66 
(2010), and used by Ostrom in the address she gave when she accepted her Nobel Prize (2010). 67 
The update resulted in a total of 11 DPs, which span the boundaries of a resource system, local 68 
conditions, rules and organizational arrangements, monitoring, conflict resolution and 69 
sanctions, and rights recognition within nested enterprises (Table 1). 70 
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Table 1. DPs modified by Cox et al. (2010) and endorsed by Ostrom (2010) 71 
Design Principles 
1A. User Boundaries: Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are 
present. 
1B. Resource Boundaries: Clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool resource from a larger 
social-ecological system are present. 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social 
and environmental conditions. 
2B. Appropriation and Provision: appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules; the distribution of 
costs is proportional to the distribution of benefits. 
3. Collective Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to 
participate in making and modifying its’ rules. 
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are accountable to, or are, the users monitor the appropriation and 
provision levels of the users. 
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals who are accountable to, or, are the users monitor the condition of 
the resource. 
5. Graduated Sanctions: Sanctions for rule violation start very low but become stronger if a user repeatedly 
violates a rule. 
6.  Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among users 
or with officials. 
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights: The rights of local users to make their own rules are recognized by the 
government 
8. Nested Enterprises: When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological 
system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers. 
 72 
The presence/absence of institutional arrangements that are consistent with these DPs 73 
may help in informing whether or not CPR institutions can be improved, and whether they are 74 
prone to failure as discussed by Ostrom (2011) during her reflection on the work of Coman 75 
(1911). In that work, Ostrom offered advice on ways that specific institutional arrangements in 76 
particular contexts can increase the effectiveness of irrigation systems’ management, and ways 77 
to assess when collective management may produce outcomes that are superior to private or 78 
public property rights. Building on that work, we focus on case studies of common property 79 
regimes, rather than common pool resources as studied by Ostrom (1990, 2010). In particular, 80 
we focus on the institutional arrangements that determine how a resource is used and, when 81 
they fail, abused. Finally, we search for the relationship between DPs and robust water 82 
institutions that have not featured in previous research. As a criterion for success, we apply the 83 
5 
 
earlier definition of robust institutions as the system outcome, where irrigation governance 84 
arrangements persist under duress producing efficient use, investment preservation, and 85 
socially-acceptable outcomes. Table A2 in the Appendix to this paper details the definition of 86 
successful robust outcomes, while the following section details our analytical method and 87 
approach in greater detail. Far greater detail can also be found in the Supplementary Material 88 
for this paper. 89 
3. Methods and materials 90 
This study employs a meta-analysis approach based on identifying what does and does not 91 
work in the governance of irrigation systems. Other studies have noted limits to the comparison 92 
of global assessments in this space (Ratajczyk et al., 2016). However, we argue that much can 93 
be learned from comparative research. We begin by searching for irrigation institutions with 94 
similarities that make meta-analysis of their key features possible. The methodology we use is 95 
based on systematic coding approaches (Poteete et al., 2010b) that use Ostrom’s DPs as 96 
explanatory variables. Coding objectivity requires an iterative process of refining the way each 97 
variable is defined through the use of qualitative comparative analysis techniques (Rudel, 98 
2008). 99 
3.1. Qualitative Comparative Analysis 100 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) bridges quantitative and qualitative data through a 101 
capacity to identify decisive cross-case study patterns. The cross-case pattern assessment 102 
process is designed to accommodate diversity among cases and account for heterogeneity with 103 
regard to different causally relevant conditions (Ragin, 1994). QCA approaches can also 104 
identify alternative combinations of conditions capable of generating the same outcome. That 105 
is, QCA is grounded in the assessment of complex relationships among variables, rather than 106 
correlation, as necessity and sufficiency are indicated when certain set relations exist. A key 107 
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feature of QCA is that it allows researchers to reduce the complexity of empirical information 108 
to achieve greater parsimony by looking for similarities and differences among cases through 109 
logical minimization (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The approach we use is consistent 110 
with Ostrom and Cox’s (2010) recommendation for the use of QCA approaches for the 111 
development of future DPs to deal with the lower-level aggregation of social-ecological 112 
systems (SES), especially where small to medium sample sizes preclude the use of more 113 
conventional statistical methods. A main strength of QCA is that it can analyze complex 114 
causations from small samples and identify the drivers of outcomes from multiple 115 
configurations of causal conditions (Ragin, 2009). The method enables assessment of context-116 
specific causality including conditions that might have a positive or negative effect depending 117 
on the context in which it is set (Marx et al., 2014). To date, QCA has been used to study 118 
irrigation institutions by Lam and Ostrom (2010) and (2015) using crisp and fuzzy datasets, 119 
respectively, derived from interview methods. Further, Baggio et al. (2016) assess the presence 120 
and absence of Ostrom’s DPs using a crisp-set QCA across forestry, fishing and irrigation 121 
CPRs. While valuable, however, the results from these studies tend to be too general to enable 122 
the development of recommendations for a change in the way a specific water resource is 123 
governed. 124 
3.2. Fuzzy-set data calibration 125 
In this study, fuzzy-set QCA (fs/QCA) methods (i.e. assessment values ranging between 0 126 
and 1) are adopted over the more common crisp-set methods (assessment values set to either 0 127 
or 1). This is justified on the basis that we seek to explain the degree of DP membership in the 128 
configuration of causal conditions that result in the emergence or maintenance of a set of 129 
arrangements that, in concert, help to maintain the robustness of an institution. In this sense, 130 
robustness is determined by institutional capacity to adapt equitably and efficiently to ever-131 
changing supply and demand conditions without variation of the underlying structure and rules 132 
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that determine the way the institution operates. The underlying structure and rules associated 133 
with each DP condition are not simply present or absent, but vary from context to context and 134 
thus require a more graduated metric in a manner that complicates the process significantly. 135 
Development of a well-constructed fuzzy-set requires a well-thought-out calibration 136 
process, as the degree of fuzzy set membership strongly influences the result of the analysis 137 
(Basurto and Speer, 2012). Consequently, Ragin (2006) recommends attention to transparency 138 
and replicability in the membership and calibration processes. Few sources provide explicit 139 
procedural advice on how to transform qualitative concepts to fuzzy values (de Block and Vis, 140 
2018). While Basurto and Speer (2012) and Toth, Henneberg and Naude (2017) offer explicit 141 
calibration procedures as a part of their research. Unfortunately, the calibration process in both 142 
studies is not suitable for our data because their calibration was predetermined before the data 143 
collection, whereas ours takes place after. Further, we require calibration after the fuzzy set is 144 
defined. Thus, we turn to Adcock and Collier’s (2001) measurement validity framework and 145 
follow the structured calibration procedure set out in Figure 1. We stress that, as indicated by 146 
the arrows, this is an iterative process and that care needs to be taken to ensure that the data are 147 
well aligned with the theoretical concepts and study objectives.148 
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Figure 1: Scoring, coding and calibration procedure 149 
In fs/QCA approaches, the causal conditions selected and outcomes chosen should be 150 
based on prior theoretical knowledge and empirical insights gained throughout the research 151 
process (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Since our study is based on Ostrom’s DPs, we use 152 
the concept definitions provided by Ostrom (2010) in Table 1 as the basis for our causal 153 
conditions. However, some of these definitions are slightly modified to conform with the 154 
irrigation institutions under examination as indicated by the bold text in Table 1. For example, 155 
consistent with recommended practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), we reduced the total 156 
number of conditions by joining User Boundary (DP1A) and Physical (resource) Boundary 157 
(DP1B) into one condition: Clearly-defined Boundary. This was done because, in most of the 158 
case studies, user boundary is confined within the physical boundary of the irrigation system. 159 
That is, users are typically socially and physically constrained to the extent of the area covered 160 
by the irrigation distribution system. The complete list of final study conditions is provided in  161 
Table 2.  162 
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Table 2: Modifications to Ostrom’s DPs for irrigation system case calibration 163 
Condition (DP) Definition 
1. Clearly-defined boundaries Legitimate users are clearly defined and identifiable. Physical 
limits on the extent of the resource are defined at all points in 
time, and across space. 
2a. System congruence with 
local conditions 
Appropriation and provision rules are congruent  with local 
and system-wide social and environmental conditions as they 
change. 
2b. Proportional equivalence 
between benefit and cost 
The benefits obtained by water users are in proportion to fixed 
and system-wide costs of operation. 
3. Collective choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can 
participate in the processes leading up to rule modification. 
4a. Monitoring of users Monitors are accountable to the users and have the 
enforcement capacity necessary to ensure compliance with 
appropriation and use rules. 
4b. Resource system 
monitoring 
System-wide monitoring and reporting exists and is 
reported to users. 
5. Graduated sanctions Appropriators who violate operational rules face sanctions, 
preferably graduated. 
6. Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost 
local arenas to resolve conflicts. 
7. Minimum recognition of 
rights to organize 
The rights of local appropriators to devise their own 
institutional structures and rules are not challenged by external 
government authorities. 
8. Nested enterprises Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterprizes. 
 164 
3.3. Case selection 165 
The cases for the meta-analysis were sourced from Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar 166 
using search terms that initially included ‘farmers’ managed irrigation institution’, ‘indigenous 167 
irrigation institution’, ‘traditional irrigation institution’, and ‘water user association’. 168 
To expand the initial list of potential case studies, snow-ball sampling methods were 169 
employed. That is, the links and references embodied in the initial articles found were used to 170 
source additional material, which continued to other articles that cited the original study via 171 
Google Scholar. To reduce any bias that may occur by sourcing only published articles, we 172 
followed recommendations provided by Poteete, et al. (2010a) and added all articles including 173 
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those that had not been peer-reviewed in the database. As a result, we ended up with an initial 174 
list of 240 potential case studies that were then screened using two inclusion criteria. First, the 175 
case study article had to examine institutional arrangements in detail. Second, where a case 176 
study did not provide enough information, we combined two or more articles that discussed 177 
the same irrigation institution into one case. In addition, we excluded any case studies that used 178 
Ostrom’s DPs to evaluate planning processes, and (combined or individual) cases studies that 179 
did not contain enough information for further analysis. Figure 2 shows the global scope of the 180 
case studies with the number per country listed in the caption to this figure (in parentheses). 181 
We ended up with 62 case studies located across 37 countries. 182 
 
Map Source: Esri (2017) 
Figure 2: Case distribution across 37 countries: Afghanistan (1), Algeria (1), Argentina (1), 
Australia (1), Bangladesh (1), Bolivia (1), Bulgaria (1), China (2), Ecuador (1), Egypt (2), 
Eritrea (2), Ethiopia (2), Haiti (1), India (2), Indonesia (5), Iran (1), Japan (1), Jordan (1), 
Kenya (3), Nepal (2), New Zealand (1), Niger (1), Nigeria (1), Oman (1), Pakistan (1), Peru 
(1), Philippines (2),South Africa (1), Spain (6), Suriname (1), Taiwan (1), Tajikistan (1), 
Tanzania (3), Thailand (3), United States (4), Yemen, (1) and Zimbabwe (1). 
3.4. Development of the fuzzy-set 183 
The preliminary list of sub-sets was derived from best-worst practices typically found in the 184 
literature and combined with insights from the case studies (Table A1 of the Appendix). The 185 
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literature and sub-set of information was then used to develop systematic coding guidelines. 186 
After the first round of the coding, we refined the fuzzy-sets and coding guidelines in 187 
accordance with the methodology’s recommended iterative process. As discussed above, a 188 
combined condition representing Clear Boundaries (BOUND) was created to more accurately 189 
represent case realities, and to reduce the total number of conditions for the fs/QCA. In the case 190 
of water governance institutions, we also specified water use rights as clearly defined if i) users 191 
have a right to abstract a certain amount of water, ii) the location as to where and when water 192 
can be abstracted are specified; and iii) the ways that abstracted water can be used are pre-193 
determined (Meinzen-Dick, 2014). Table 3 provides a list of the final fuzzy-set conditions and 194 
outcomes. Table A1 of the appendix lists the scoring guideline that were applied 195 
Table 3: Abbreviation of the DPs that are used in the analysis. 196 
Ten Conditions and an outcome Design Principle Abbreviation 
Clearly-defined boundaries DP 1 BOUND 
Congruence with local conditions DP 2A LOCCON 
Proportional COST and benefit DP 2B BENFCOST 
Collective governance DP 3 COLLGOV 
User monitoring DP 4A USERMON 
System monitoring DP 4B SYSTMON 
Graduated sanctions DP 5 GRADSAN 
Conflict resolution mechanisms DP 6 CONFRES 
Minimum right to organize DP 7 RIGHT 
Nested enterprizes DP 8 NESTENT 
Robust institutions Outcome ROBUST 
 197 
3.5. Analytic Hierarchy Process 198 
Transforming the raw case study data into fuzzy-set values always produces some degree of 199 
arbitrariness (Skaaning, 2011). To reduce arbitrariness, measurement is needed to translate 200 
fuzzy concepts into quantitative scores, that can be subsequently transformed into final fuzzy 201 
values. For validity, the measurement criteria need to capture meaningful ideas that accurately 202 
reflect the concept being used (Adcock and Collier, 2001). We, therefore, followed the Analytic 203 
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Hierarchy Process developed by Saaty (1990) which suggests two-stage pairwise comparisons 204 
prior to setting the final fuzzy scores. The first pairwise comparison weights the measurement 205 
criteria. The second pair-wise comparison then compares the fuzzy-set based on all criteria. 206 
For example, as described by Saaty (1990), if we were buying a house we could first assess 207 
each individual option using a common set of criteria, and then secondly (when all houses were 208 
evaluated) use those criteria again to compare the full set of purchase options and identify the 209 
best purchase choice. 210 
Thus, we first identified a set of criteria to measure the fuzzy-set using information 211 
from the literature and substantive knowledge from the case studies. We then translated the 212 
DPs into a series of questions that could be used to identify opportunities to increase the 213 
robustness of a water institution (Ostrom, 2009). For example, for DP1 we identified four major 214 
criteria for clearly-defined user/resource boundaries and water use rights that could be used to 215 
increase robustness. Second, we employed the two-stage pairwise ranking of conditions 216 
wherein the first stage comparison allowed us to weight each criterion, and the second stage 217 
allowed us to determine how much the fuzzy-set complied with each criterion. The resultant 218 
pairwise comparison matrixes had a consistency ratio of CR ≤ 0.1, meaning that the priority 219 
ranking of the fuzzy-sets was consistent, and therefore acceptable (Saaty, 2008). 220 
3.6. Systematic coding 221 
Next, a coding system was developed in Nvivo based on the fuzzy sub-sets listed in Table A1of 222 
the Appendix. We conducted content analysis on the 62 cases, and each case was coded 223 
according to the fuzzy definitions. A memo was linked to a case whose content did not directly 224 
comply with the fuzzy-set, but where the meaning was implied throughout the article. In these 225 
cases, the data was coded accordingly. The memo also included citation details from other 226 
supporting documents to supplement information from the main case study article. Where 227 
possible (and necessary) additional information was obtained via personal communication with 228 
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case-study authors to clarify ambiguous data. All coding was conducted by the first author and, 229 
hence, no inter-coder reliability tests were required. In recognition of the fact that this could 230 
result in coder bias, however, we developed a set of strict procedures to minimize the risk that 231 
this could occur as detailed in the Supplementary Materials to this paper. 232 
3.7. Calibration of the fuzzy-set scores 233 
Using indirect methods of calibration recommended by Ragin (2006), we transformed the 234 
initial fuzzy-set score into one of four values. A full membership value of 1 was assigned to a 235 
fuzzy-set with the highest score, indicating the most favorable manifestation of the institutional 236 
criteria. A membership value of 0 was assigned to fuzzy-set with the lowest scores, indicating 237 
the worst manifestation of the institutional criteria. A challenge with fuzzy concepts is that it 238 
is difficult to justify the cross over (threshold) point; therefore we did not assign 0.5 values in 239 
the fuzzy-sets. Furthermore, cases with maximum ambiguity (i.e. 0.5 fuzzy values) cannot be 240 
dealt with in fs/QCA analysis (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014). Instead, with due consideration 241 
based on i) our theoretical and substantive knowledge of the empirical studies and ii) the 242 
distance in a compliance score between full- and non-member, intermediate scores were 243 
assigned based on values of 0.33 which indicated whether a governance arrangement was more 244 
out than in; and 0.67 for a governance arrangement that was more in than out (Basurto and 245 
Speer, 2012). The fuzzy-set values were then assigned to all cases in the fuzzy data matrix. 246 
3.8. Missing data and the meaning of zero “0” 247 
Out of the 62 cases, there are 46 complete cases, while 16 cases contain missing data 248 
mainly associated with the presence or absence of graduated sanction mechanisms (13 cases or 249 
20%) and conflict resolution mechanisms (5 cases or 8%). All missing data were coded initially 250 
with a zero fuzzy value that resulted in “0” values in the truth table analysis. However, some 251 
of the cases with missing data showed a ROBUST outcome. Therefore, in a subsequent 252 
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analysis, we chose to explore why the absence (or presumed absence) of these conditions might 253 
not have compromised a ROBUST outcome rather than assuming that presence of the condition 254 
increases robustness as typically discussed in the literature. Therefore, a “0” value in this study 255 
has three meanings, i.e. “truly absent” (when the condition was indeed absent), “not in the set” 256 
(missing data: when the condition was not specifically discussed in the case study and is 257 
therefore ambiguous), and “not applicable” (which mainly applied to nested conditions. Since 258 
most of the case studies were small scale and there was no indication of them being part of a 259 
complex or larger institution, we suspect that in most cases graduated sanctions operate – even 260 
though there is no mention of them. All of these meanings are identified and explored in the 261 
solution path of sufficiency conditions discussed later. 262 
3.9. Data analysis 263 
Finally, we analyzed the data using fs/QCA v3.0, developed by Ragin and Davey (2017). Based 264 
on Ostrom’s views regarding DP lists, the model used for analysis is as follows: 265 
BOUND*LOCCON*BENFCOST*COLLGOV*USERMON
*SYSTMON*GRADSAN*CONFRES*RIGHT*NESTENT 
→ ROBUST (1) 
The above formula simply reflects a hypothesized combination of DPs that may lead to 266 
robust water institutions. Capital letters denote that the conditions and outcomes are PRESENT 267 
in an irrigation area. However, unlike a regression equation that would consist of dependent 268 
and independent variables, the fs/QCA model presents its causal conditions in the left-hand 269 
side and the outcome on the right. Further, the process involves Boolean operators as presented 270 
in Table 4: logical AND (*) which combines conditions (set intersect) to the smallest score, 271 
logical OR (+) which joins conditions (union set) to the highest score, and logical NOT (~) that 272 





Table 4: Description of Boolean operators used in the study. 276 
Boolean operation Symbol Description 
Logical AND  * Combine condition (set intersect) to the smallest score  
Logical OR + Join condition (union set) to the highest score 
Logical NOT ~ Signify negation (absent) of condition or outcome 
 277 
Finally, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend that study data are first analyzed 278 
for necessary conditions before performing any analysis of sufficiency conditions. By 279 
necessary, we mean that whenever outcome Y is present, the condition X was also present. To 280 
address this requirement, a truth table was constructed from the fuzzy value matrix prior to 281 
sufficiency analysis. It contains rows of all possible combinations of causal conditions. We set 282 
the value of 1 for frequency cut-off to identify empirical relevant causal configuration, and 283 
0.80 for consistency cut-off to determine which configuration pass the fuzzy-set theoretic 284 
consistency in the Quine-McCluskey minimization procedure (Ragin, 2009). We then 285 
performed a standard analysis of the truth table for configuration of conditions that are 286 
sufficient for robust irrigation institutions. 287 
4. Results 288 
4.1.  Necessary conditions 289 
The results of the analysis in Table 5 show the consistency and coverage values are 290 
generally high for the presence of DPs in irrigation institutions, suggesting good approximation 291 
of set-relations (Ragin, 2006) and the relevance of DPs for ROBUST outcomes. However, only 292 
four of the DPs pass the 0.9 consistency threshold value (Skaaning, 2011) for identification as 293 
necessary conditions; that is, BOUND, USERMON, SYSTMON, and RIGHT. Of those, 294 
BOUND also has the highest coverage value of 0.98 which indicates the relative importance 295 
of this condition compared to others. We also tested necessary conditions for failed systems 296 
(~ROBUST) and found that only ~BOUND passed the consistency threshold with a value of 297 
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0.959 and coverage of 0.870; which is clearly not trivial. This again emphasizes the necessity 298 
of clearly defined boundaries for robust irrigation institutions. 299 
Table 5: Analysis of necessary conditions for robust (ROBUST) and failure (~ROBUST) 300 
outcome. 301 
ROBUST  ~ROBUST 
Condition Consistency Coverage  Condition Consistency Coverage 
BOUND 0.949 0.985  ~BOUND 0.960 0.871 
LOCCON 0.761 0.936  ~LOCCON 0.855 0.562 
BENCOST 0.862 0.880  ~BENCOST 0.672 0.635 
COLGOV 0.833 0.897  ~COLGOV 0.733 0.612 
USERMON 1.000 0.889  ~USERMON 0.653 1.000 
SYSTMON 0.971 0.950  ~SYSTMON 0.858 0.914 
GRADSAN 0.708 0.882  ~GRADSAN 0.735 0.474 
CONFRES 0.839 0.771  ~CONFRES 0.305 0.405 
RIGHT 1.000 0.889  ~RIGHT 0.652 1.000 
NESTEST 0.738 0.894  ~NESTEST 0.756 0.508 
             
Note: bold indicates passing the consistency threshold of 0.9 for a necessary condition. 302 
Next, following a process described in Goertz (2006), we create 2 x 2 tables to search 303 
for sufficiency effects associated with the four identified necessary conditions. According to 304 
this process, when the bottom right-hand cell (X, ~Y) is equal to zero, a necessary condition is 305 
maximally relevant to a sufficient condition. With regard to the DPs for the irrigation 306 
institutions included in our study, the results shown in Table 6 suggest that, while all of the 307 
necessary conditions identified have important sufficiency condition effects, none of them is 308 
sufficient on its own to produce a ROBUST outcome. The bottom left-hand cells (~X, ~Y) 309 
show reasonable numbers of observations indicating that necessary conditions are not trivial 310 
(Goertz 2006). Interestingly, only BOUND has a zero value in the bottom right cell (BOUND, 311 
~ROBUST) which indicates that the clearly-defined boundary DP appears to be maximally 312 
relevant as a sufficient condition. However, the presence of two cases in the upper left cell 313 
(~BOUND, ROBUST) seems to contradict the necessity finding reported above. The two 314 
deviant cases were the Nshara and Mkanyeni canals in Tanzania. In these cases, the users were 315 
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known but water access and risk sharing were inequitable (fuzzy values of 0.33). Both 316 
irrigation systems were managed by ethnic groups with significant power asymmetry that lead 317 
to inequity in the rights to use water. However, despite this inequality, the self-governing 318 
institutions in question had persisted for many generations. This finding agrees with Agrawal’s 319 
(2001) observation that hierarchical social arrangements in the distribution of benefits can be 320 
sustainable despite inequitable access sharing, such as those of caste systems or areas with 321 
ethnic and/or racial inequality. Rohlfing and Schneider (2013) also suggest deviant cases can 322 
be the result of under-specification, i.e. omission of the SUIN condition, which stands for a 323 
‘sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor, that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome’ 324 
(Mahoney et al., 2009). This finding supports our decision to examine joined conditions, and 325 
we will return to a consideration of that issue after some discussion of parsimonious solutions 326 
below. 327 
Table 6: Necessary conditions for robust irrigation system institutions 328 
Table 5a. BOUND  Table 5b. USERMON 
 ~BOUND BOUND   ~USERMON USERMON 
ROBUST 2 41  ROBUST 0 43 
~ROBUST 19 0  ~ROBUST 13 6 
       
Table 5c. SYSTMON  Table 5d. RIGHT 
 ~SYSTMON SYSTMON   ~RIGHT RIGHT 
ROBUST 0 43  ROBUST 0 43 
~ROBUST 17 2  ~ROBUST 10 9 
       
 329 
4.2. Analysis of sufficiency conditions 330 
The results of the truth table analysis show there are seven configurations of conditions 331 
that are sufficient for ROBUST irrigation institutions, as presented in Figure 3. The notation 332 
here follows Fiss (2011) and Ragin and Fiss (2008) who differentiate between core and 333 
peripheral or complementary conditions. Core conditions are those that appear in the 334 
18 
 
parsimonious and the intermediate solutions, while peripheral conditions only appear in the 335 
intermediate solution (Fiss, 2011). The complete set of truth table results are available in Table 336 
A3 in  the Appendix to this paper. 337 







USERMON*SYSTMON or 0.971 0.231 0.978 
LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT 0.740        0 1.000 
Solution coverage: 0.971    
Solution consistency: 0.978    
 339 
Figure 3 shows two distinct groups of causal configurations. Group 1 relies on the first 340 
parsimonious solution, i.e. the combination of user monitoring AND system-wide monitoring 341 
(USERMON*SYSTMON). The USERMON condition is considered present when monitoring 342 
of users has a strong enforcement capacity to ensure rule compliance. The SYSTMON 343 
condition denotes that a comprehensive monitoring of water resource conditions and status is 344 
in place, and results are accessible to all in a timely manner. These characteristics allow the 345 
systems and users to adjust as local circumstances vary. Interestingly, in cases where clear 346 
GRADSAN or CONFRES conditions—which are considered important in successful CPR 347 
management—are uncertain, USERMON AND SYSTMON conditions consistently appear. 348 
The paths that treat GRADSAN as ‘don’t care’ reflect data that may be present or absent in the 349 
case study but result in the same outcome. Sufficient conditions that include ~GRADSAN 350 
(i.e. absence of graduated sanctions) are shared by groups of cases that have either i) high 351 
mutual trust within the community (such as irrigation institutions found in Chaisombat, 352 
Nishikanbara LID, Shirgin, Tharigat watershed, Ghayl, and Zanjera Danum), ii) high control 353 
over water allocation mechanisms (Falaj Al Khatmeen, Nabargram, Sidi Okba), or iii) both. 354 
These cases include evidence of minimum conflict and free-rider problems, which may suggest 355 
reasons as to why the authors did not discuss this DP in detail—and as such may be coded as 356 
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missing data in our analysis. However, in the Nishikanbara in Japan and Ghayl in Yemen cases, 357 
the authors discuss the role of social norms and mutual trust that prevent users from free riding. 358 
All other cases with ~GRADSAN characteristics display failure (~ROBUST) in the outcome. 359 
 360 
Figure 3: Sufficient configurations of conditions for robust irrigation institutions (intermediate 361 
solution) 362 
Group 2 (2a and 2b) relies on the second parsimonious solution; the combination of 363 
Congruence with local condition AND  system-wide monitoring AND Minimum rights to 364 
organize (LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT) as decisive factors. That is, when users have the 365 
authority to self-organize and devise operational rules within a defined framework (RIGHT), 366 
they can adapt to various conditions as they change (LOCCON) provided they have required 367 
information about relevant resources at the right time (SYSTMON). The solution paths for 368 
Group 2 treat the BOUND condition as ‘don’t care’, as the presence or absence of that condition 369 
result in the ROBUST outcome. In these cases, the LOCCON condition becomes essential in 370 
the configuration. Solution 2a belongs to small communities in Tanzania (Nshara) and Nepal 371 
(Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo) where conflict resolution is missing (~CONFRES). The importance 372 











Raw coverage 0.520 0.447 0.337 0.433 0.315 0.066 0.080
Unique coverage 0.117 0.029 0.008 0.008 0.022 0.059 0.008
Consistency 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Solution coverage 0.689
Solution consistency 1.000
       denotes core condition (present),       denotes complementary or contributing condition (present),      denotes
complementary condition (absent), blank spaces indicate "don't care" situation where a condition could be present 
or absent. Cov= coverage; Con = consistency. 
Cov: 0.74; Con: 1.000Cov: 0.71; Con: 0.978
Conditions




of conflict resolution mechanisms was clearly mentioned in the case study introduction 373 
material, but then not discussed in the case study findings. However, Raj Kulo and Thulo Kulo 374 
both displayed evidence of having installed devices that tracked water distribution more 375 
precisely, as a means to reduce conflict (Martin and Yoder, 1988), while in Nshara furrow 376 
irrigators adopted equity and fairness principles to prevent conflict (Gillingham 1999).  377 
4.3. Tests of joined conditions 378 
The results above show that all of the conditions which passed the consistency threshold 379 
of the necessary condition analysis were also present in the parsimonious solution paths—380 
except BOUND. However, despite being present in the solution paths for both Groups, which 381 
should indicate its’ necessity, LOCCON did not pass the original consistency threshold test. 382 
This brings us back the issue of SUIN conditions mentioned previously. We hypothesize that 383 
both BOUND and LOCCON are SUIN conditions and that their union (BOUND+LOCCON) 384 
may reveal whether they are individually unnecessary or insufficient for ROBUST institutional 385 
outcomes, but constitute shared rules necessary for ROBUST irrigation institutions. To test this 386 
hypothesis, we use the enhanced XY plot (Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013) to determine whether 387 
these two conditions can be treated as SUIN conditions. All XY plots were created using 388 
Tosmana v1.6 (Cronqvist, 2018). 389 
Figure 4a maps the distribution of cases between the BOUND condition and ROBUST 390 
outcome to show that, despite being highly relevant with zero cases in Cell 3 (see the centre of 391 
figures for cell numbering references), the two deviant cases in Cell 6 contradict the necessity 392 
of the BOUND condition as discussed previously. Figure 4b maps the distribution of cases 393 
between the LOCCON condition and ROBUST outcomes showing that Cell 1 contains 30 cases 394 
which exclude the LOCCON condition from achieving necessity status, notwithstanding it 395 
being present in all of the solution paths. This suggests that, consistent with SUIN principles, 396 
the presence of LOCCON ensures ROBUST outcomes in cases such as Nshara and Mkanyeni 397 
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where the BOUND condition is absent. However, the SUIN condition means that cases without 398 




Figure 4a: Enhanced XY plot of 
BOUND condition 
 Figure 4b: Enhanced XY plot of 
LOCCON condition 
Unlike the rigid irrigation governance systems in Mendoza, both Mkanyeni and Nshara 400 
have flexible working rules for water appropriation including allowing the limited transfer of 401 
shares and/or allocation.1 This allows them to reduce some of the inequality dimension between 402 
users, supporting the persistence of the institutions for long periods of time. A direct 403 
comparison between these cases might not be appropriate, however, since the irrigation system 404 
in Mendoza is larger and more complex compared to the small scale irrigation institutions of 405 
Mkanyeni and Nshara. Nevertheless, we consider that comparison is justified on the basis that 406 
the three cases were awarded membership in the same fuzzy value category; that is, is more in 407 
that out of the BOUND condition, even though they display different outcomes. An additional 408 
analysis of the SUIN consistency and coverage values for BOUND+LOCCON reveals a value 409 
                                                 
1 In Nshara, temporary transfer took place within the same irrigation system with neighbours or relatives, 
providing that whoever borrowed or bought water (although selling water was considered illegal) also participated 
in maintenance activities. To reduce risk and inequality of water access, farmers in Mkanyeni located their plots 
in different zones. Shared farming during water shortages also took place for the same purpose. 
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of 0.978, which suggests that the SUIN condition is necessary. The coverage of 0.936 indicates, 410 
also, that it is not trivial. Although Figure 5 shows that there are six cases in Cell 3 that reduce 411 
the sufficiency effect, it does not contradict the necessary condition evaluation (Goertz, 2006; 412 
Rohlfing and Schneider, 2013). This implies that while it is necessary, the SUIN condition 413 
alone is not sufficient to achieve ROBUST irrigation system institutions. Figure 5 also shows 414 
that there is a deviant case in Cell 1, but the outcome can still be explained by the presence of 415 
the condition. 416 
 
Figure 5: Enhanced XY plot of BOUND+LOCCON 
conditions 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 417 
One way to test the robustness of fsQCA analysis is to reduce the number of cases (de Bora et 418 
al 2016). We, therefore, re-ran the analyses using complete case studies only, to discover that 419 
GRADSAN and CONFRES are also necessary for ROBUST outcomes. The result is expected 420 
because, as discussed earlier, these two conditions were usually the source of missing data. The 421 
test for ~ROBUST also returned consistent results showing that only ~BOUND is necessary. 422 
Likewise, the truth table analysis indicates that the parsimonious solutions remained the same, 423 
while the intermediate solutions showed only four configurations in Figure 3; that is, 1a, 1c, 424 
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1e, and 2b. As a result, we consider that there is no reason to question the reliability of our 425 
findings as a result of the presence of some missing data. For further detail, readers are directed 426 
to the sensitivity analysis section in the Supplementary Materials. 427 
5. Discussion 428 
The results reported above support Ostrom’s view that no list of DPs, if complied with, is likely 429 
to be sufficient to ensure institutional robustness. For the irrigation institutions included in the 430 
study, however, it has been possible to identify a set of four necessary conditions which 431 
increase robustness: these are clearly-defined boundaries, user monitoring, system-wide 432 
monitoring, and minimum rights to organize. The seven configurations of conditions that 433 
appear to be sufficient for robustness agree with previous studies that have found that not all 434 
DPs have to be present in successful CPR management (e.g. Baggio et al., 2016). The 435 
configuration of causal conditions is context specific. Our findings are consistent, however, 436 
with Ostrom’s (2009) view that the presence of more design principles in a self-organizing 437 
institution increases robustness. The solution path to 2B, however, needs to be treated with 438 
caution as it includes the absence of proportional benefit and cost as a pathway to robustness. 439 
Three cases in this group, (i.e. Valencia, Bada Spate irrigation and Mkanyeni) all have full cost 440 
recovery but the distribution of benefits was generally inequitable (fuzzy value 0.33). This  441 
indicates that calibrating the concept requires treatments of ‘more in than out’ (0.67), in which 442 
the design principle includes the concept of cost recovery that distributed proportionally to the 443 
benefit received by the users. In traditional irrigation systems, cost recovery typically is not a 444 
major issue as most irrigation infrastructures are built using cheap materials sourced from the 445 
surrounding landscape, and are thus easier to maintain with labour and in-kind contribution by 446 
the farming community. By contrast, modern irrigation delivery systems may be capital 447 
intensive, where the cost of operating and maintaining such systems may not be resolved by 448 
in-kind and labour contributions from farmers. This would indicate why low-cost recovery has 449 
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been a concern for modern irrigation institutions, especially in developing countries (Sampath, 450 
1992). 451 
The results also found two alternative configurations that consistently present in 452 
institutions characterized by robustness. As can be seen above, the causal conditions in the 453 
parsimonious solutions mirror the necessary conditions except for that of clearly-defined 454 
boundaries and congruence with local conditions, which we identify as SUIN conditions 455 
(discussed below). Given that this study has highlighted the importance of some DPs including 456 
clear user and resource boundaries, rules that are congruent with local conditions, monitoring 457 
of both users and the resource system, and local rights to organize—and the relevance of these 458 
DPs as alternative pathways to success—we expand upon each of those with some additional 459 
examples and detail from the case study materials. 460 
5.1. Clearly-defined boundaries and congruent appropriation rules as SUIN conditions. 461 
In the face of future scarcity and unpredictability, robust water institutions must include 462 
property-right structures that are secure yet adaptable enough to support change while 463 
providing incentives for users to invest in maintaining the resource and the parts of the system 464 
that are under their control (Howe et al., 1986; Quiggin, 1988). Clearly-defined user/resource 465 
boundaries and congruent appropriation rules both represent the requisite property rights 466 
structure. In our case studies, typical appropriation rules reflect the boundary definition of the 467 
resource setting: who gets water, when, where, how much and for what use are the shared rules 468 
that clearly and completely define the boundary of the resource system, and at the same time 469 
clearly guide the development of  working rules that enable efficient and equitable 470 
appropriation. Further, all of the ROBUST outcomes cases displayed some degree of security 471 
and flexibility in their institutional arrangements. These two characteristics do not necessarily 472 
contradict one other; rather the irrigation community usually managed to design shared access 473 
arrangements which allowed users to adapt to changes in supply while respecting the 474 
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assignment of longer-term property rights structures (e.g. annual scarcity pressures can be 475 
managed separately from longer-term considerations). 476 
Two types of flexibility are typically discussed in the literature, and appear in the cases. 477 
First, Ostrom (1990) emphasizes the congruence of appropriation rules with local conditions 478 
where water is allocated in response to the changing water availability either by rotation or 479 
turn-taking, reducing water proportionally, or assigning different use priorities under different 480 
situations. Second, there may be flexibility in the way that longer-term opportunities to access 481 
water can be transferred to other uses or users, or from one place to another, as climate, 482 
demographic and economic conditions change over time (Howe et al., 1986). Table 8 provides 483 
some examples of the differences between failed and robust irrigation systems. 484 
Table 8: Comparison of failed and robust surface and groundwater irrigation systems 485 
 Failed Systems Robust Systems 
Surface water Kuhl Tharigat watershed 
Access to water Priority of water in kuhls are given to 
paddy farmers. (Water use right to 
kharif is formally registered/ 
documented). 
Ten villages shared water in the 
Tharigat watershed according to a pre-
agreed schedule. 
Sharing rules at system 
level 
Clear among kuhls irrigation before 
new entrants started using water in 
the upper and middle reaches of the 
irrigation system. 
Clear time sharing and rotation 
schedule for water allocation for each 
village. 
Source of change in the 
access to water 
New entrant: new rice fields in the 
upper stream. 
New entrant: government takes water 
from the river in the upper stream to 
supply drinking water to the nearby 
city. 
Impact or response to 
change in access to water 
Uncontrolled use of water upstream. 
Useless downstream water rights 
because irrigation ran dry/system 
became non-operational. 
Water supply decreased significantly. 
Re-arranged water time sharing and 
rotation is organised for each village. 
Proportional reduction of cultivated 
area. 
Surface water Mendoza Valencia (Old) 
Access to water Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
right is attached to land. 
Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
right is attached to land. 
Sharing rules at system 
level 
Proportional ownership. Proportional ownership. 
Response to water 
shortage/ scarcity 
Rotation; proportional reduction 
irrespective of different needs. 
Applied different priority in short 
term, long term and emergency 
planning based on equity principles; 
proportional reduction. 
Impact on access to water Unable to respond to scarcity or 
drought. Increased illegal pumping 
Different strategy of water allocation 
allows the system to achieve efficiency 
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by big farmers to augment water 
supply. 
while still maintaining equity 
principles.  
Groundwater Gnangara aquifer system Eastern La Mancha aquifer system 
Access to water 10-year fixed annual entitlement. The 
licensing system specified an 
authorized use or purpose to which 
extracted water is to be put. Water 
rights are transferable. 
Proportional to cultivated area. Water 
is attached to land.  
Response to water scarcity Variability of water resource 
condition is not considered; 
information on water condition not 
readily available.  
Reduction of abstraction volume per 
hectare to increase water level in the 
aquifer as agreed by farmers’ 
association and water authority. 
Impact on water resources Water overdraft, water resource 
degradation  
Water levels still show downward 
trend but farmers’ association and 
water authority are building a solid 
institutional framework in which to 
introduce sustainable practices. 
 486 
Whichever sharing/appropriation rule mechanisms apply, there are two main lessons 487 
that can be derived from the case studies. First, water-sharing arrangements at the system level 488 
must be in place prior to the need to change allocation arrangements occurs. Second, while a 489 
sense of equity in maintaining user resource sharing in CPR management is important 490 
(Quiggin, 1993), in practice the distribution arrangements must be allowed to evolve. 491 
Therefore, it is critical to establish individual water use rights that are clearly-defined and 492 
difficult to contest. Only by gaining secure access to water will users be willing to invest in the 493 
operation and maintenance of the system, and to ensure productive use of the irrigation system 494 
resources over time. The case studies also assist us to understand how robust institutions 495 
emerge as a consequence of these conditions. Spate irrigation systems in Eritrea 496 
(Ghebremariam and van Steenbergen, 2007; Mehari et al., 2005) have existed for many 497 
generations despite unequal access to water. Since this irrigation institution relies on access to 498 
seasonal floods, water supply is highly uncertain and unpredictable. As a result, complex 499 
arrangements for water appropriation are mixed with other social mechanisms to ensure 500 
members perceived the rules as fair. This has resulted in continued farmer membership in the 501 
resultant CPR collective. Similarly, in Valencia, the irrigation community maintained equality 502 
of access through proportional appropriation rules and applied different access priorities as 503 
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conditions changed to ensure fair access perceptions by users (Glick, 1970; Maass and 504 
Anderson, 1978). Alternatively, Barnett et al. (2016) provide evidence of how the application 505 
of proportional access in two groundwater-based irrigation systems in Spain became 506 
incongruent with the broader economic, social and technological conditions surrounding the 507 
system, causing the institutions to fail. This highlights the relevance of local conditions for 508 
robust outcomes, and the importance of property rights structures, as suggested by Quiggin 509 
(1988), in keeping the appropriation rules congruent with the nature of the characteristics of 510 
the physical resource and social demands on it. 511 
5.2. User and system-wide monitoring 512 
The parsimonious solutions in Table 7 show that the raw coverage of 513 
USERMON*SYSTMON is comparatively higher than LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT. In 514 
addition, it has a unique coverage of 0.231 which shows that around 23% of the cases can be 515 
explained by this solution alone, without the need for others. Based on these two features, the 516 
USERMON*SYSTMON solution may, therefore, be considered more important than the 517 
LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT solution. However, it is important to note that the concept 518 
used for monitoring users and resources in our systematic coding was slightly different to that 519 
of Cox et al. (2010). While separating monitoring of users (DP4A) from the monitoring of 520 
resources (DP4B) in their modified DPs (see Table 1), Cox et al. (2010) suggest that they 521 
indicate the presence of monitoring for both users and resources in DP4A, while DP4B 522 
indicates any accountability of the monitors in the institutions.2 The same approach was used 523 
by Baggio et al (2016). In our view, keeping the two monitoring types included in DP4A 524 
separate (as in Table 1) is beneficial in helping to search for and find ways of increasing the 525 
                                                 
2 “Principle 4A stipulates the presence of monitors, whereas 4B stipulates the condition that 
these monitors are members of the community or otherwise accountable to those members.” 
(Cox et al 2010: Principle 4: Monitoring). However, the authors reviewed the importance of 
environmental monitoring for adaptation. 
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robustness of irrigation institutions. In our view, combining the monitoring of individual user 526 
behavior with the benefits of reporting on the status of the entire resource is about two separate 527 
issues that run the risk of being ignored by researchers when investigating CPRs using 528 
Ostrom’s DPs.  529 
In support of this view, we found evidence of such oversight in some of the case studies. 530 
In the case in Kenya (Likii WRUA) and two cases in China (Wang and Wen villages), for 531 
example, the authors clearly identified the presence of monitoring (focusing on users and the 532 
status of use), and that the monitors were accountable to users. However, despite the presence 533 
of all DPs according to the authors, they observed significant inequality between users (in all 534 
cases), difficulties in coping with changed socioecological conditions (Likii WRUA), and over 535 
exploitation of water resources (Wang and Wen villages). These three cases indicate two 536 
important points: i) there can be a lack of enforcement despite the presence of accountable 537 
monitors and monitoring the users/resources, and ii) if resource monitoring does not exist, or 538 
the information cannot be accessed in a timely manner to adapt to the social-ecological change, 539 
failure is more likely. We coded these three systems as ‘fragile’. In addition, the comparison 540 
of two groundwater-based irrigation institutions in Table 8 indicate how monitoring of, and 541 
timely available information on, resource conditions clearly contribute to robust institutions. 542 
Therefore, establishing an effective individual use monitoring system is important so that 543 
aspiring, but ineligible, users can be excluded and that allocations, once made, are complied 544 
with.  545 
Different from other types of CPR where failure of the system tends to impact all 546 
resource users in the same way, often weak water institutions involve adverse unidirectional 547 
impacts where the actions of upstream users can impose unfair and socially inefficient impacts 548 
on downstream users – especially during short-term water scarcity. This is particularly evident 549 
in the three ‘fragile’ cases mentioned above. Separate system-wide monitoring should ensure 550 
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equitable sharing of the available resource. At the broader level under effective enforcement 551 
rules, eligible downstream users are able to exercise their rights while not violating others; thus 552 
preventing infringement upon the common property resource. Further, resource monitoring is 553 
essential for effective planning and decision-making in natural resource management contexts 554 
(Babu and Reidhead, 2000). Finally, the flexible appropriation and provision rules discussed 555 
above depend on timely information from the monitoring process, which will inform the need 556 
for the system and users to adapt to various conditions as they change. In support of this 557 
conclusion, all of the FAIL cases in this study had no proper monitoring systems in place, nor 558 
was use infringement or system condition information easily accessible in a timely manner. 559 
5.3. Combining congruence principles,  system-wide monitoring and the right to organize to 560 
aspire adaptive capacity 561 
As outlined above, water is unique compared to other types of natural resources as it 562 
tends to flow from upstream to downstream, with sequential use and re-use values and extremes 563 
in terms of quantity, quality and time of impact (Hanemann, 2006). It has destructive power 564 
during floods or can create severe competition in a long drought. These features make water 565 
management more challenging, especially where management requires rapid adaptation. The 566 
second parsimonious solution which combines congruence of appropriation and provision rules 567 
with local conditions, system monitoring and the minimum right to organize 568 
(LOCCON*SYSTMON*RIGHT) represents a pathway to increased adaptive capacity, and 569 
through this system robustness. Consistent with acting upon the information provided from an 570 
effective monitoring system, institutional success necessitates active group management with 571 
the authority to hold members in check over their use of system resources (Bromley, 1992). 572 
Most importantly, these arrangements must also be capable of responding to dynamic changes 573 
in economic, social and environmental conditions at particular times and places as rapidly as 574 
these changes occur. To achieve rapid adaptation, authority appears to be best left with the 575 
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local users/managers since they are more familiar to the local context and directly face the 576 
immediate changes or problems (Cundill and Fabricius, 2009) but these authorities need to be 577 
nested within robust system-wide structures.  578 
In all irrigation systems, the minimum information required typically includes access 579 
to continuously updated information on the quantity of water available for irrigation so that the 580 
community and individuals can plan for water allocation and use, and, also, maintain 581 
infrastructure in a timely manner. The more complex the irrigation delivery system and 582 
generally the larger it is, the more important system-wide monitoring. Table 8 shows how 583 
robust institutions make use of information to respond and adapt to various changes in 584 
condition including how they adjust the working rules to maintain congruence with local 585 
conditions over time (as discussed earlier). By comparison, in institutions where information 586 
paucity prevents timely adaptation and response to socio-ecological change, or where links to 587 
larger irrigation systems outside of operating boundaries prevent local modification of 588 
operational rules (e.g. the Kuhl case study), institutional decline or failure is the typical 589 
outcome. Our finding that RIGHT design principles constitute a necessary condition for robust 590 
outcomes is highly consistent with these outcomes. Local decision-making, however, is only 591 
part of the solution; there is a need to also incorporate wider political, economic and 592 
environmental information into the local decision-making process and prevent resource users 593 
in one part of the system having impacts on other parts of the system in a manner that is 594 
inconsistent with agreed system-wide rules. That is, the right to organize locally should not 595 
compromise the shared rules at the system level. 596 
5.4. Proposed design principle modifications 597 
Our analysis of 62 irrigation systems corroborates Cox et al.’s (2010) conclusion that 598 
Ostrom’s DPs are well supported by empirical evidence. In this study, the fs/QCA approach 599 
proved useful for examining institutional arrangements with respect to each of the design 600 
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principles in more detail; it allowed us to identify certain necessary conditions and alternative 601 
configurations of causal conditions that could lead to robust irrigation institutions. Based on 602 
this analysis, we are in a position to suggest some further irrigation-system focused 603 
modifications to Ostrom’s DPs (Table 9) with respect to ongoing congruence (DP 2A), the 604 
linking of monitoring to enforcement arrangements (DP 4A), and the clearer reporting 605 
responsibility by system monitors to system users—rather than monitoring alone that could be 606 
applied to other irrigation CPRs as a test of their usefulness more generally. 607 
Table 9: Proposed further modifications to Ostrom’s DPs for broad application 608 
 Three DPs as listed in Ostrom (2010)  Modified DPs based on the comparative 
analysis 
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: 
Appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local social and 
environmental conditions. 
Congruence with Local Conditions: 
Appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local and system-wide 
social and environmental conditions as they 
change. 
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are 
accountable to or are the users monitor 
the appropriation and provision levels 
of the users. 
Monitoring Users: Monitors are accountable 
to the users with enforcement capacity 
necessary to for ensuring compliance 
with agreed appropriation and use rules 
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals 
who are accountable to or are the users 
monitor the condition of the resource. 
System-wide monitoring: System-wide 
monitoring and reporting exists and is 
reported to users in a timely manner.  
 609 
Consistent with Ostrom’s desire to test theory with empirical data in this space, we, 610 
therefore, offer these modifications for application and testing by scholars whose work aims to 611 
increase the robustness of irrigation institutions. We would be interested to see tests of 612 
necessity and sufficiency in other CPR settings to determine any common DP conditions or the 613 
identification of additional alternative solution pathways. Such research would bring us closer 614 
to the objectives set out by Ostrom for determining if the DPs continue to stand the test of 615 
time—as we hope future water governance institutions will. 616 
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6. Concluding Comments 617 
The design of water governance and allocation systems remains an art and, while many get to 618 
write about opportunities to improve them, very few people are invited to participate in their 619 
renewal; especially when the necessary changes involve the significant re-specification of the 620 
processes and institutional arrangements that determine who gets access to water. Moreover, 621 
in the real world of water governance and allocation, there is an immense amount of detail that 622 
never gets written down. Our aim, however, was to search for insights that can be used to 623 
convince communities that the current suite of institutions used to manage their water resources 624 
are flawed, can be fixed and, if fixed, will help to deliver prosperity. The collection of evidence 625 
from many case studies across a substantial number of countries is one way of doing this. The 626 
results, which emerged from a careful examination of a fuzzy set of data, identified a) four 627 
necessary conditions; b) seven solution path configurations; and, perhaps more importantly, c) 628 
a union of conditions that, when absent, are likely to result in system failure during times of 629 
stress and/or when demands for access are shifting. 630 
The approach taken attempts to deal, as objectively as possible, with the need for 631 
concrete advice in a world where, at best, the concepts are fuzzy and situation specific. We 632 
have aimed, as objectively as possible, to come up with a suite of recommendations that could 633 
assist in the transformation of failing systems into ones that could confidently be described as 634 
robust, and also for changes that can be made in order to ensure that systems which are currently 635 
performing well continue to do so. That is, we aspire to the development of institutional 636 
arrangements that those reliant upon the system’s water resources can be confident will serve 637 
them well, especially in times of stress and as new demands emerge. The recommended 638 
modifications of three of Ostrom’s DPs add a new temporal dimension to her work; emphasis 639 
on the importance of attending to appropriation arrangements designed to facilitate change and, 640 
also, stressing the importance of monitoring both system-wide and individual use conditions. 641 
33 
 
Our suggested modifications also identify a need to understand how design principles interact 642 
with one another. Robustness is enhanced by arrangements that, for example, understand the 643 
interdependence of monitoring at different scales, allocation arrangements and enforcement 644 
capacity. 645 
Finally, the research reported here is reliant on the development of analytical techniques 646 
that seek to reduce arbitrariness. All the judgements made are summarized in the Appendix and 647 
Supplementary Material attached to this paper. When it comes to methodology, the highly 648 
skewed nature of the data collected suggests a need for more fine-grained analysis. At the 649 
moment, the best that we can do is identify relationships among broad, very fuzzy, concepts. 650 
Much more research is needed, for example, on concepts like “enforcement capacity;” 651 
“appropriation and use rule” options; and ways to ensure that “appropriation and provision 652 
rules are congruent with current, and flexible enough to cope with future, local social and 653 
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